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INTRODUCTION 
ew societies have suffered as has contemporary Iraq. Today, Iraq is 
a nation under foreign occupation1 with a horrifying history of sav-
age authoritarian rule.2 Transitional justice mechanisms that address this 
legacy are critical to the stability and reconstruction of that troubled 
state.3 In particular, mechanisms aimed at national reconciliation could 
do much to allay sectarian divisions in Iraq, notably those created by the 
                                                                                                               
 1. A 2006 study published by the British medical journal The Lancet estimates that 
as many as 654,965 Iraqis may have died between March 2003 and July 2006 as a result 
of the American invasion. Gilbert Burnham et al., Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of 
Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey, 368 THE LANCET 1421, 1421 (2006), 
available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140673606694919/ 
fulltext. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior American Commander in Iraq, presented 
figures to Congress on September 10, 2007 estimating that between July, 2006 and Au-
gust 2007 there were over 30,000 Iraqi civilian deaths. See Multi-National Force–Iraq 3 
(Sept. 10–11, 2007), available at http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/09/10/petraeus. 
slides.pdf. 
 2. The egregious and systematic human rights violations in Iraq under the Ba’ath 
regime have been well-documented and are beyond the scope of this paper. Arguably the 
best source on the monstrous inhumanity of the Ba’ath regime is Kanan Makiya’s mas-
terly study first published in 1989 and later updated in 1998. See KANAN MAKIYA, 
REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN IRAQ (updated ed. 1998). See also INT’L 
CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, IRAQI 
VOICES: ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION v 
(2004), available at http://www.hrcberkeley.org/download/Iraqi_voices.pdf [hereinafter 
IRAQI VOICES] (“Hundreds of thousands killed or missing, hundreds of mass graves, crip-
pled state institutions, and a political culture shaped by three decades of one-party rule 
and dictatorship are but four contemporary realities.”); Opening Statement by Pierre-
Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of 
State: Before the Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th Cong. 1–2 (2003) (statement by Pierre-
Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes) (“[T]he Iraqi regime has repeat-
edly committed atrocities and serious violations of the laws of war over a twenty-year 
period, including: [t]he gassing and killing of between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds during 
the Anfal campaign in 1998; [t]he brutal oppression and torture of Kuwaitis in 1991, 
displacing 1.5 million people, killing more than 1,000 Kuwaitis and leaving over 600 
persons missing; [t]he brutal suppression of Shi’a Muslim insurgencies in southern Iraq 
in 1991, with indiscriminate attacks that killed between 30,000 to 60,000 persons, the 
draining of the southern marshes, and the secret execution of thousands; [a]nd a series of 
violations during Iraq’s war with Iran.”). 
 3. See, e.g., JAMES A. BAKER, III & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP 
REPORT 19 (2006) (“The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of 
national reconciliation.”). 
F 
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Sunni minority’s persecution of the Shi’a majority4 and the Sunni Ba’ath 
regime’s genocide of the Kurdish population.5 
Consequently, while transitional justice is indispensable to Iraq in its 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy, it also faces unique chal-
lenges. The President of the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies and the President of the Association of the United States Army co-
authored a perceptive article in 2002 entitled Toward Postconflict Recon-
struction.6 The article delineates four “pillars” that all post-conflict socie-
ties must establish in their transition from war to peace or authoritarian 
rule to democracy: security; justice and reconciliation; social and eco-
nomic well-being; and governance and participation.7 While the authors 
acknowledge that these four pillars are “inter-related,” they also note that 
security is the “sine qua non of postconflict reconstruction.”8 Today, the 
security pillar has yet to be erected in Iraq.9 Until it has been established, 
                                                                                                               
 4. See, e.g., SAÏD K. ABURISH, SADDAM HUSSEIN: THE POLITICS OF REVENGE 122–23, 
183–85 (2000) [hereinafter ABURISH, POLITICS OF REVENGE]. 
 5. On April 4, 2006 the Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IST”) announced that it had charged 
Saddam Hussein with genocide of Iraqi Kurds. See Edward Wong, Hussein Charged with 
Genocide in 50,000 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at A1. At least one Dutch court 
has already found that the attack on Iraqi Kurds in Halabja in March 1998 constituted 
genocide. See Killing of Iraqi Kurds “Genocide”, BBC News, Dec. 23, 2005, available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4555000.stm (explaining that the ruling came in the 
“case of Dutch trader Frans van Anraat, who was given a 15-year sentence for selling 
chemicals to Saddam Hussein’s regime”). 
 6. John J. Hamre & Gordon R. Sullivan, Toward Postconflict Reconstruction, 25:4 
WASH. Q. 85 (2002). 
 7. Id. at 91–92. 
 8. Id. 
 9. The February 22, 2006 explosion of the Askariya, or Golden, Mosque in Samarra, 
one of the Shi’ites’ most revered shrines, has so inflamed sectarian tensions that scholars, 
journalists, and policymakers fear that Iraq is now in the midst of a civil war. For back-
ground on the attack on the Askariya Mosque see PETER W. GALBRAITH, THE END OF 
IRAQ: HOW AMERICAN INCOMPETENCE CREATED A WAR WITHOUT END 1–12 (2006). 
  The argument that Sunni-Shi’a tensions have so deteriorated in Iraq that the coun-
try is now in civil war is perhaps most forcefully made by former Ambassador Peter 
Galbraith. In a devastating critique of American policy, Galbraith comments: “Insur-
gency, civil war, Iranian strategic triumph, the breakup of Iraq, an independent Kurdistan, 
military quagmire. These are all consequences of the American invasion of Iraq that the 
Bush Administration failed to anticipate.” Id. at 7. See also Sean D. Naylor, Retired Gen-
erals Blast Rumsfeld, ARMY TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, at 10 (“[M]any observers now debate 
whether the country is on the brink of civil war.”); Phil Rosenthal, Journalists War Over 
“Civil War”, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2006, at C1 (“Allawi has called it a civil war . . . and a 
growing number of Americans have decided that’s exactly what it is. A Los Angeles 
Times/Bloomberg poll of 1,357 adults nationwide this week found 56 percent of respon-
dents believed Iraq was ‘currently engaged in a civil war’ . . . .”); Civil War (Siv-el Wôr), 
n. 1 A Violent Conflict Between Organized Groups Within a Country, WASH. POST, Apr. 
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transitional justice mechanisms will fail to contribute their full potential 
and must be used sparingly. While acknowledging this reality, this paper 
looks cheerfully to a hopefully not-too-distant future when transitional 
justice mechanisms can be implemented to their full potential in a peace-
ful and stable Iraq. 
Part I of this Article provides a conceptual analysis of transitional jus-
tice. Throughout this section, various transitional justice mechanisms 
will be considered as the author believes that a comparative study better 
assists one in more fairly evaluating a particular approach. Part II consid-
ers the 1991 Czech lustration law. Particular emphasis is placed on this 
law because prima facie, the need for de-Ba’athification may be analo-
gized to the need for de-Communization. In both cases, strong arguments 
can be made that party leaders responsible for building a repressive to-
talitarian apparatus and committing systematic human rights violations 
should not be trusted to carry out democratic reforms and must therefore 
be estopped from serving in positions of power. Indeed, lustration in the 
                                                                                                               
9, 2006, at B03 (“[T]he war in Iraq has been a civil war not simply since the escalation of 
internecine killings following the bombing of [the Golden Mosque] in February, but at 
least since the United States handed over formal control to an interim Iraqi government in 
June 2004.”); Whether It’s Civil War or Not, Iraq Still Needs Military Help, TAMPA 
TRIB., Mar. 21, 2006, Nation/World, at 14 (“The Iraqi occupation is entering its fourth 
year with violence escalating. Some people here and in Iraq are calling the situation civil 
war . . . .”); Iraq ‘Now in the Grip of Civil War’, THE HERALD (Glasgow), March 20, 
2006, at 1 (“We are losing each day as an average 50 to 60 people throughout the coun-
try, if not more. If this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is.”) (quoting for-
mer interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi); Desiree Cooper, Unholy Attacks Call Faithful 
Into Action, DETROIT FREE PRESS, March 2, 2006, at 1 (“The death count is now in the 
hundreds as the region hurtles toward civil war.”); Mosque Attack Arrests, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Sydney), March 1, 2006, at 21 (“The attack on Samarra’s Golden Mosque 
led to widespread retaliatory attacks on the minority Sunni community, sparking fears of 
civil war.”); Editorial, Nervous Days, THE PRESS (Christchurch, New Zealand), Feb. 27, 
2006, at 10 (“There can be no doubt that the attack on the Golden Mosque was designed 
to create even more intense religious hatred and even spark a religious civil war.”); Rich-
ard Sisk, New Wave of Death and Hate: 100 Killed as Sunnis, Shiites Clash; U.S. Troops 
Don’t Take Sides as the Fear of Civil War Grows, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 24, 2006, at 
21 (“This is the first time that I have heard politicians say they are worried about the 
outbreak of civil war.”) (quoting a Kurdish elder statesman in an interview with the As-
sociated Press); Editorial, Iraq Is on the Brink; Destruction of the Golden Mosque Is a 
Major Test for Nation Rebuilding, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 24, 2006, at A8 (“No moment in 
the aftermath of the U.S-led invasion has led Iraq closer to civil war than Wednesday’s 
attack that shattered the iconic golden dome . . . .”); The Golden Mosque, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Feb. 23, 2006, First Section, at 1 (“Iraqi president Jalal Talabani pleaded with 
his countrymen to ‘work together’ against the danger of ‘civil war.’”); Louise Roug, Iraqi 
Shiites Erupt Over Shrine Attack, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1 (“Almost three years 
after the April 2003 U.S.-led toppling of the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein, more 
politicians and ordinary citizens began to utter the words ‘civil war’ openly.”). 
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form of de-Ba’athification, has had appeal in Iraq.10 Nevertheless, as Part 
II details, there are several concerns with lustration as a tool of transi-
tional justice. Part III returns to post-Ba’ath Iraq and considers the transi-
tional justice mechanisms heretofore implemented. The Article con-
cludes with several recommendations to achieve transitional justice in 
Iraq. 
I. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
A. Conceptual Overview 
Professor Ruti Teitel, one of the preeminent students of transitional 
justice, has defined the approach as “the conception of justice associated 
with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to con-
front the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”11 Transitional 
justice, therefore, is concerned with how “a state dedicated to the rule of 
law come[s] to terms with the lawlessness of a prior government, without 
in the process infringing on its own commitment to legality and imparti-
ality.”12 Thus, all models of transitional justice seek to answer how a 
state reconciles an evil past, or in the words of Václav Havel, a “mon-
strous heritage.”13 They are all concerned with what Samuel Huntington 
has referred to as the “torturer problem.”14 
                                                                                                               
 10. See, e.g., Peter Slevin & Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Iraq’s Baath Party is Abolished: 
Franks Declares End of Hussein’s Apparatus as Some Members Retake Posts, WASH. 
POST, May 12, 2003, at A10 (“U.S. authorities have made ‘de-Baathification’ a goal of 
the occupation period.”). 
 11. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 
(2003) (footnote omitted). 
 12. Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., Dilemmas of Justice: A Forum on the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court Decision Overturning a Retroactivity Law, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 
Summer 1992, at 17. 
 13. Karel Bartošek, Central and Southeastern Europe, in THE BLACK BOOK OF 
COMMUNISM: CRIMES, TERROR, REPRESSION 394, 451 (Stéphane Courtois et al. eds., Jona-
than Murphy & Mark Kramer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1999). 
 14. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 211 (1991). Huntington posits that whether a state will pursue tran-
sitional justice depends on how the non-democratic leaders exit. Id. at 228. That is, if, 
like Saddam Hussein, the leader was forced out, there will be a desire for retribution. See 
id. at 217–19. On the other hand, Huntington argues that if the non-democratic leaders 
voluntarily stepped down or “negotiated their way out,” often in the face of mass protests, 
the nation would be more likely to “forgive and forget.” Id. at 225–28. For criticism of 
Huntington’s hypothesis, see Kieran Williams et al., Explaining Lustration in Eastern 
Europe: “A Post-Communist Politics Approach” 8 (Sussex Eur. Inst., Working Paper 
No. 62, 2003), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/wp62.pdf. 
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Transitional justice has two key features. First, it includes restorative 
concepts of justice, such as the redressing of harms to a community,15 
that extend well beyond prosecutions.16 Second, it “is transitional, which 
refers to a major political transformation, such as regime change from 
authoritarian or repressive rule to democratic or electoral rule or a transi-
tion from conflict to peace or stability.”17 This second feature distin-
guishes the much broader concept of transitional justice from restorative 
justice, considered below.18 Although “[t]he origins of modern transi-
tional justice can be traced to World War I,”19 the field “gained coher-
ence in the last two-and-a-half decades of the twentieth century, espe-
cially beginning with the trials of the former members of the military 
juntas in Greece (1975) and Argentina (1983) . . . .”20 
The instruments of transitional justice vary enormously.21 The Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice (“ICTJ”), for example, identifies 
                                                                                                               
 15. Restorative justice takes the victim and the community into account with respect 
to criminal law, in contrast to the perpetrator-centric approach emphasized in a retributive 
justice system. See Christa Obold-Eshleman, Note, Victims’ Rights and the Danger of 
Domestication of the Restorative Justice Paradigm, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 571, 572–73 (2004). See also Susan Opotow, Psychology of Impunity and Injus-
tice: Implications for Social Reconciliation, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 201, 209 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) (“Restorative . . . justice also focuses on redress, but it does 
so by viewing transgressions primarily as harm inflicted on human relationships and sec-
ondarily, as violations of the law.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Neil J. Kritz, The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in 1 TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES xxiv–xxvi (Neil 
J. Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter Kritz, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice] (surveying a 
number of non-criminal instruments falling under a transitional justice methodology). 
 17. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1045 (2004). 
 18. See infra, Part I.B. 
 19. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, supra note 11, at 70. Professor Teitel has 
proposed a “genealogy” of modern transitional justice “divide[d] along three phases.” Id. 
at 69. She explains: 
[T]ransitional justice becomes understood as both extraordinary and interna-
tional in the postwar period after 1945. The Cold War ends the internationalism 
of this first, or postwar, phase of transitional justice. The second, or post-Cold 
War, phase is associated with the wave of democratic transitions and moderni-
zation that began in 1989. . . . The third, or steady-state, phase of transitional 
justice is associated with contemporary conditions of persistent conflict which 
lay the foundation for a normalized law of violence. 
Id. at 70. 
 20. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 17, 
at 1046. 
 21. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary 
Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 766 (2004) (“The tools of transitional justice include 
trials, truth commissions, reparations, apologies, and purges.”). 
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five key approaches: “prosecuting perpetrators, documenting and ac-
knowledging violations through nonjudicial means such as truth commis-
sions, reforming abusive institutions, providing reparations to victims, 
and facilitating reconciliation processes.”22 These tools are often further 
categorized in terms of what they hope to accomplish: peace (reconcilia-
tion as the primary goal) or justice (retribution and deterrence as the pri-
mary goals).23 A holistic approach to transitional justice seeks to balance 
these two forces. Indeed, one of the most complicated dilemmas transi-
tioning states face is drawing a line between a search for justice and a 
crusade for revenge or, as Václav Havel has explained, “manag[ing] to 
steer between Scylla and Charybdis.”24 
Because transitional justice has among its many aims the punishment 
of those who inflicted harms on society and the compensation of those 
who have suffered, some scholars have come to view it as “backward-
                                                                                                               
 22. Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Mission and History, http://www.ictj.org/en/ 
about/mission (last visited Aug. 15, 2007). 
 23. Critics of the most visible truth commission, the South African Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission (“SATRC”), have argued that by granting limited amnesties in 
exchange for testimony, the SATRC “famously traded justice for truth—an exchange 
deeply resented by many of those who had been victimized by the state security forces or 
the families of those victims.” John Torpey, Introduction: Politics and the Past, in 
POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES 1, 9–10 (John Torpey ed., 
2003). While volume one of the SATRC’s report acknowledges the criticism, it grounds 
the justification for the amnesty process in the desire to compile the most complete his-
tory possible: 
  The amnesty process was also a key to the achievement of another objective, 
namely eliciting as much truth as possible about past atrocities. The primary 
sources of information were the perpetrators themselves who, without the op-
tion of applying for amnesty, would probably not have told their side of the 
story. 
  For many victims, the granting of amnesty was a high price to pay for the 
public exposure of perpetrators. . . . 
  Yet, as many commentators noted, trials would probably have contributed far 
less than did the amnesty process towards revealing the truth about what had 
happened to many victims and their loved ones. 
1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT ch. 5, paras. 64–
66 (Susan de Villiers ed., 1998) [hereinafter SATRC Report]. 
 24. Adam Michnik & Václav Havel, Confronting the Past: Justice or Revenge?, 4 J. 
DEMOCRACY 20, 21 (1993), reprinted in 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING 
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 536, 537 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). 
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looking.” 25  Nevertheless, in a compelling argument, Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule assert the opposite: 
[T]ransitional justice can also be understood in forward-looking terms: 
providing a method for the public to recapture lost traditions and insti-
tutions; depriving former officials of political and economic influence 
that they could use to frustrate reform; signaling a commitment to 
property rights, the market, and democratic institutions; and establish-
ing constitutional precedents that may deter future leaders from repeat-
ing the abuses of the old regime.26 
To these arguments can be added that it is only by completely and 
openly acknowledging the past that a society can move forward and be-
gin the process of reconciliation required to construct a peaceful and sta-
ble post-conflict society.27 
Two criticisms are often leveled at a transitional justice approach. 
First, it is often argued that transitional justice “draw[s] morally arbitrary 
distinctions in deciding which groups to benefit”28 or “what types of 
harm to compensate.”29 For example, Posner and Vermeule note that 
“Germany’s post-Holocaust restitution program . . . included Jews but 
excluded gypsies and homosexuals.”30 For a more contemporary exam-
ple, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“SATRC”) 
came under a great deal of criticism in its decision to limit “its investiga-
tion to gross violations of human rights defined as the ‘killing, abduction, 
torture or severe ill-treatment,’” 31 thereby excluding millions of black 
Africans who suffered socially and economically under the system of 
apartheid.32 A second criticism is that transitional justice judgments can 
                                                                                                               
 25. The German political scientist Claus Offe, for example, has described transitional 
justice as comprising “problems of retroactive justice.” CLAUS OFFE, VARIETIES OF 
TRANSITION: THE EAST EUROPEAN AND EAST GERMAN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 82 (1996). 
 26. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 766. 
 27. See, e.g., SATRC Report, supra note 23, ch. 1, para. 20 (“We could not make the 
journey from a past marked by conflict, injustice, oppression, and exploitation to a new 
and democratic dispensation characterised by a culture of respect for human rights with-
out coming face to face with our recent history.”). 
 28. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 808. 
 29. Id. at 809. 
 30. Id. at 808 (citation omitted). 
 31. SATRC Report, supra note 23, ch. 2, para. 19. 
 32. See id. para. 20 (“The Commission’s focus was, therefore, a narrow or restricted 
one, representing what were perhaps some of the worst acts committed against the people 
of this country and region in the post-1960 period, but providing a picture that is by no 
means complete.”). See also Reed Brody, Justice: The First Casualty of Truth? The 
Global Movement to End Impunity for Human Rights Abuses Faces a Daunting Question, 
THE NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 25 (“The TRC process has been rightly challenged be-
cause it focused not on the apartheid system itself, including massive displacements and 
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not be fairly implemented because the past actions of former officials 
were often motivated by a plethora of reasons—not least of which is the 
argument that many collaborators participated in an unsavory regime 
because they were forced.33 Despite these criticisms, there is no denying 
that “[t]he movement from repressive regimes to democratic societies 
has become a worldwide phenomenon” 34  and transitional justice ap-
proaches provide the greatest hope for shepherding broken states toward 
a stable and just peace. 
B. Retributive v. Restorative Justice 
Historically, criminal law in the United States has been based upon a 
retributive justice system.35 Under such a system, “perpetrators commit 
crimes against the state, not against other people.”36 Central to a retribu-
tive justice system is the concept of just deserts.37 That is, the system’s 
primary focus is to make sure that “offenders get[] what they deserve.”38 
Until fairly recently, a retributive justice system was also the primary 
paradigm in international criminal law and some scholars believed that 
such a system served to support the rules of international law.39 Never-
theless, with the end of the Cold War and an accompanying shift in the 
characterization of conflicts from inter- to intra-state,40 two questions 
emerged regarding the applicability of a retributive international criminal 
justice system. First, how far removed is retributive justice from venge-
                                                                                                               
the pass system, but on ‘excesses’ that even apartheid considered criminal, like murder 
and torture.”). 
 33. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 811–12. 
 34. Richard H. Solomon, Preface, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 16, at xiii. 
 35. Mica Estrada-Hollenbeck, The Attainment of Justice Through Restoration, Not 
Litigation, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE, AND COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 65, 
66 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a 
Retributivist Theory of International Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 273, 277–78 
(2005) (“Retributivist theory has long been identified with its theory of individual desert, 
of the proper treatment of individuals in light of their individual acts.”). 
 38. HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 21 (2002). 
 39. See, e.g., Michelle Maiese, Retributive Justice (May 2004), http://www.beyond 
intractability.org/essay/retributive_justice (“Retributive justice is a matter of giving those 
who violate human rights law and commit crimes against humanity their ‘just deserts.’ 
Punishment is thought to reinforce the rules of international law and to deny those who 
have violated those rules any unfair advantages.”). 
 40. See STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST., SIPRI YEARBOOK 2005: 
ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY app. 2A, at 121 (2005) (not-
ing that in 2004 there were nineteen major armed conflicts, and all the conflicts were 
intra-state (including Iraq), although in three conflicts external states contributed troops). 
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ance?41 Second, does a system premised on just deserts serve the inter-
ests of an international community in which member states are often at-
tempting to emerge from protracted and savage civil wars?42 
Mica Estrada-Hollenbeck has argued that a retributive justice system 
has limited utility in resolving protracted ethnic and sectarian conflicts.43 
She explains that to “resolve [a conflict] is to leave the conflicted parties 
with institutions and attitudes that favor peaceful interactions. This sort 
of resolution . . . requires the establishment of working trust.” 44 Such 
trust, she concludes, is undermined in a retributive system, which 
“mak[es] [the] conflict resolution processes less stable and reconciliation 
less likely.”45 Similarly, as victims’ rights are often subordinated in a 
retributive justice system,46 Howard Zehr, the “grandfather of restorative 
justice,”47 has identified four victims’ needs that a retributive justice sys-
tem neglects: information,48 truth-telling,49 empowerment,50 and restitu-
tion.51 
In light of these and other criticisms of a retributive system of interna-
tional criminal justice, there is an “increasing interest in the concept of 
restorative justice.”52 Zehr has defined restorative justice as “a process to 
involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific of-
fense and to collectively identify and address harms, needs, and obliga-
tions, in order to heal and put things as right as possible.”53 Unlike re-
tributive justice, restorative justice views crime not as “a violation of the 
                                                                                                               
 41. Thomas W. Porter, Jr., The Spirit and the Law, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1155, 1158 
(1999). 
 42. See Estrada-Hollenbeck, supra note 35, at 69. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 71. 
 46. See, e.g., Obold-Eshleman, supra note 15, at 572 (“[A retributive] justice system 
defines crime as breaking the law, thus causing harm to the state as the representative of 
society in general. Accordingly, rather than the specific victims, the state is the primary 
party in dealing with the offense . . . .”). 
 47. ZEHR, supra note 38, at 76. 
 48. Id. at 14 (“Victims need answers to questions they have about the offense—why it 
happened and what has happened since. . . . Securing real information usually requires 
direct or indirect access to offenders who hold this information.”). 
 49. Id. at 14–15 (“Often . . . it is important for victims to tell their stories to the ones 
who caused the harm and to have them understand the impact of their actions.”). 
 50. Id. at 15 (“Involvement in [victims’] own cases as they go through the justice 
process can be an important way to return a sense of empowerment to them.”). 
 51. Id. (“When an offender makes an effort to make right the harm, even if only par-
tially, it is a way of saying ‘I am taking responsibility, and you are not to blame.’”). 
 52. Joseph V. Montville, Justice and the Burden of History, in RECONCILIATION, 
JUSTICE, AND COEXISTENCE, supra note 35, at 129. 
 53. ZEHR, supra note 38, at 37. 
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law and the state” but as “a violation of people and relationships.”54 
Moreover, whereas justice in a retributive system “requires the state to 
determine blame (guilt) and impose pain (punishment),” restorative jus-
tice “involves victims, offenders, and community members in an effort to 
put things right.”55 Consequently, under a restorative justice system, the 
“aim of the judicial system . . . is to reconcile conflicting parties while 
repairing the injuries from the crimes.”56 The inquiry does not end, how-
ever, with the determination that a transitional or retroactive57 justice 
system will best serve the needs of a post-conflict society. Such systems 
contain a dizzying array of choices, some of which may, at times, seem 
mutually exclusive of others, as the section below considers. 
C. Truth v. Justice 
Juan E. Méndez, President of the ICTJ, has argued that post-conflict 
nations with a heritage of human rights violations owe their victims four 
distinct duties: 
The first of these is an obligation to do justice, that is, to prosecute and 
punish the perpetrators of abuses when those abuses can be determined 
to have been criminal in nature. The second obligation is to grant vic-
tims the right to know the truth. . . . The third obligation is to grant 
reparations to victims in a manner that recognizes their worth and their 
dignity as human beings. . . . Finally, states are obliged to see . . . that 
those who have committed the crimes while serving in any capacity in 
the armed or security forces of the state should not be allowed to con-
tinue on the rolls of reconstituted, democratic law-enforcement or secu-
rity-related bodies.58 
Regrettably, these four duties are often viewed as antagonistic rather 
than complementary and the debate is often framed in terms of “truth 
versus justice.”59 
                                                                                                               
 54. Id. at 21. 
 55. Id. See also Estrada-Hollenbeck, supra note 35, at 74 (“Unlike the [retributivist] 
approach, the restorative justice approach identifies crime primarily as conflict between 
individuals that results in injuries ‘to victims, communities, and the offenders themselves, 
and only secondarily as a violation against the state.’”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See supra note 25. 
 58. Juan E. Méndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 12 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997). 
 59. See, e.g., Dealing with the Past: Critical Issues, Lessons Learned, and Challenges 
for Future Swiss Policy 33 (Swiss Peace Found., Working Paper No. 2/2004, 2005), 
available at http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/KOFF/KOFF_ 
DealingWithThePast.pdf [hereinafter Dealing with the Past]. 
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1. Truth: A Right to Disclosure? 
Professor Tim Kelsall, among others, has argued that “[d]emands for 
the truth, and for commissions to investigate it, are becoming the norm in 
societies emerging from periods of violent conflict or authoritarian 
rule.”60 For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, six truth commissions were 
established.61 In the 1990s that number more than doubled to fourteen.62 
As Kelsall concludes, “that number looks set to increase again in the cur-
rent decade.”63 Indeed, in its 2003–2004 annual report, the International 
Center for Transitional Justice noted that “[i]n recent months, others 
have decided to launch truth commissions: the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Liberia, Morocco [the first truth commission in the Arab 
world], [and] Paraguay.”64 Moreover, in 2005, the first truth and recon-
ciliation commission in the United States was convened in Greensboro, 
North Carolina.65 One of the most thoughtful students of truth commis-
                                                                                                               
 60. Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 361, 362 (2005). 
 61. The six commissions included: Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of 
People in Uganda Since the 25th January, 1971 (1974); National Commission of Inquiry 
into Disappearances in Bolivia (1982–1984); National Commission on the Disappearance 
of Persons in Argentina (1983–1984); Investigative Commission on the Situation of Dis-
appeared People and Its Causes in Uruguay (1985); Commission of Inquiry in Zimbabwe 
(1985); and Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights in Uganda (1986–
1995). PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS 305–307 (2002). 
 62. The fourteen commissions included: Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons 
Disappeared During the Panchayet Period in Nepal (1990–1991); National Commission 
on Truth and Reconciliation in Chile (1990–1991); Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes 
and Misappropriations Committed by the Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or 
Accessories in Chad (1991–1992); Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Former 
African National Congress Prisoners and Detainees in South Africa (1992); Commission 
of Inquiry for the Assessment of History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in 
Germany (1992–1994); Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (1992–1993); Commis-
sion of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelty and Human Rights Abuse Against 
ANC Prisoners and Detainees by ANC Members in South Africa (1993); Commissions of 
Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in Sri Lanka (1994–
1997); National Commission for Truth and Justice in Haiti (1995–1996); International 
Commission of Inquiry in Burundi (1995–1996); Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa (1995–2000); Truth and Justice Commission in Ecuador (1996–1997); 
Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have 
Caused the Guatemalan People to Suffer (1997–1999); and Commission of Inquiry for 
the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Nigeria (1999–2000). Id. at 307–310. 
 63. Kelsall, supra note 60, at 362. 
 64. INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2003/2004, 10, 13 
(2005), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/7/176.pdf. 
 65. See generally Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project, 
http://www.gtcrp.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). The purpose of the Greensboro Truth and 
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sions, Priscilla Hayner, notes that they are “fast becoming a staple in the 
transitional justice menu of options.”66 
Mary Albon has written that there are three distinct benefits to telling 
the truth about the past: “1) [T]o seek justice for the victims and help 
restore their dignity; 2) to facilitate national reconciliation; and 3) to de-
ter further violations and abuses.”67  Contemporary truth commissions 
serve all of these functions and more. The most apparent purpose of truth 
commissions is what Hayner refers to as “sanctioned fact-finding: to es-
tablish an accurate record of a country’s past, clarify uncertain events, 
and lift the lid of silence and denial from a contentious and painful pe-
riod of history.”68 Some human rights activists argue, however, that truth 
commissions do not find the truth as much as raise “the veil of denial 
about widely known but unspoken truths.”69 
The Swiss Peace Foundation notes that truth commissions are particu-
larly useful in two instances. The first instance occurs in nations where 
“the systems of abuse . . . [were] designed to hide the facts [and] [t]orture 
and related abuses were committed largely in secret.”70 Second, in na-
tions such as Bosnia, where the truth is not hidden, but “multiple 
‘truths’” exist, truth commissions allow the real truth to be known and 
made part of the nation’s history by focusing “on the broad history and 
patterns of abuses.”71 As Michael Ignatieff, former director of the Carr 
Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University explains, “[t]he 
past is an argument and the function of truth commissions, like the func-
tion of honest historians, is simply to purify the argument, to narrow the 
range of permissible lies.”72 
                                                                                                               
Community Reconciliation Project is to “heal broken relations within [the] community by 
. . . distinguishing truth from falsehood and allowing for . . . public mourning and for-
giveness.” Darryl Fears, Seeking Closure on “Greensboro Massacre”; Reconciliation 
Panel Convenes in N.C. to Address ‘79 Attack by Nazi Party, Klan, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 
2005, at A3 (omissions in original) (quoting Commissioner Cynthia Brown). Specifically, 
the project will examine the causes and consequences of the 1979 Greensboro Massacre, 
in which members of the Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazis clashed with the anti-Klan Com-
munist Workers Party (“CWP”), resulting in the death of five CWP members. Id. In 
criminal trials before all-white juries, no one was convicted. Id. 
 66. Brody, supra note 32. 
 67. Mary Albon, Project on Justice in Times of Transition: Report of the Project’s 
Inaugural Meeting, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 43. 
 68. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND 
ATROCITY 24–25 (2001) [hereinafter HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR]. 
 69. Id. at 25. 
 70. Dealing with the Past, supra note 59, at 22. 
 71. Id. 
 72. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 25. 
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Since their inception in the 1970s, the scope of truth commissions has 
steadily increased so that most present day commissions incorporate a 
broader focus on reconciliation.73 As Robert Rotberg, President of the 
World Peace Foundation, has explained, “South Africa’s [TRC] is the 
prime example of a commission with . . . a comprehensive vision of how 
such an effort can prevent future conflict and ensure that ‘never again!’ 
becomes a societal reality.”74 Rotberg concludes, “[t]he [South African] 
TRC, though flawed in many ways, has set a high standard for future 
commissions.”75 Indeed, some activists express concern that “because of 
South Africa, the international community has become blindly besotted 
with truth commissions, regardless of how they are established.”76 
Truth commissions should not be seen as a panacea for every country 
emerging from protracted violence, and yet, all too often, commissions 
are established in post-conflict nations that prove to be poor candidates 
and fail to heed the lessons learned from past commissions. 77  Chief 
                                                                                                               
 73. See, e.g., Dealing with the Past, supra note 59 at 23 (“Beyond simply an account-
ing of victims and perpetrators, recent commissions focus more explicitly and expan-
sively on reconciliation.”). 
 74. Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and 
Reconciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 3, 4 (Robert 
I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. Brody, supra note 32, at 25. 
 77. An example is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by the Sun 
City Accord for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By most accounts, the Commis-
sion was improperly established and has proven entirely ineffective. The Commission’s 
mandate is to “consider political, economic, and social crimes committed from 1960 until 
2003 in order to establish truth and help bring individuals and communities to reconcilia-
tion.” Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity 
(Jan. 2004) http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/02/congo7230.htm. In a perspicacious 
paper written for the International Center for Transitional Justice, Federico Borello ex-
presses great concern with both the Commission’s consultative process and its composi-
tion. See FEDERICO BORELLO, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, A FIRST FEW STEPS: 
THE LONG ROAD TO A JUST PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 40–42 
(2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/1/115.pdf. The paper makes the 
following conclusion: 
  It is unlikely that the current commission will be able to function effectively 
as an investigative body for the following reasons: 
Lack of legitimacy because of its composition and insufficient con-
sultation prior to its creation. . . . 
Security concerns for staff, victims, and witnesses. 
Lack of sufficient time for the commission to complete its investiga-
tions and submit a final report before the end of the transition. 
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among those lessons is the importance of a partnership with a vibrant 
civil society.78 As the Swiss Peace Foundation explains in a government 
report entitled Dealing with the Past: 
Without the active participation of civil society and without the resul-
tant sense of public ownership of and investment in the process, a truth 
commission could produce a technically accurate history of the conflict 
and abuses, but the report might be relegated to an academic shelf . . . . 
. . . As a consequence, a nation in which the institutions and organiza-
tions of civil society have been wholly decimated by civil war or by a 
long period of harsh repression will not, in general, be an appropriate 
candidate for a truth commission.79 
A 2001 article in The Nation delineates some of the other lessons 
learned: “[T]o be as effective as the [South African] TRC, truth commis-
sions must be independent, well resourced and endowed with subpoena 
power; must hold public hearings when necessary; and must be able to 
name the accused publicly.”80 The article concludes “[f]ew commissions 
today meet these criteria.”81 Moreover, in a world with finite resources in 
terms of funding and attention, a truth commission may divert such re-
sources from justice efforts.82 Reed Brody, advocacy director of Human 
Rights Watch, relates a telling experience he had in Haiti: 
                                                                                                               
Apparent lack of sufficient reflection on key provisions of the law, 
such as amnesty, reparations, and other matters. 
Lack of necessary political will to support the commission’s work. 
Id. at 46. 
 78. Dealing with the Past, supra note 59, at 23 (“In various countries, those sectors of 
civil society that have contributed to the truth commission process have included reli-
gious groups, representatives of the media, human rights and victims’ organizations, the 
business, medical and legal communities, historians, sociologists, psychologists, and 
political organizations.”).   
 79. Id. The Secretary-General makes a similar point in a 2004 report on transitional 
justice. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. 
S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Report on Transitional 
Justice] (“Factors that can limit [truth commissions’] potential benefits include a weak 
civil society . . . .”). 
 80. Brody, supra note 32. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Neil J. Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-
Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 55, 62 [hereinafter Kritz, 
Progress and Humility] (noting that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) staff felt that a Bosnian truth and reconciliation commission would 
“be a source of competition for international resources and local attention”). 
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In Haiti, where I worked with President Aristide’s minister of justice, 
we were explicitly told by international donors that they could not fund 
a special prosecutor’s office—the government’s priority—because they 
were supporting a truth commission (whose report, published years af-
ter its completion, only confirmed what people already knew about 
coup-era repression).83 
A terribly controversial element of truth commissions has been the 
granting of amnesty, tantamount to a prohibition on punishment of those 
guilty of human rights violations. As Charles O. Lerche III notes, “[o]n 
balance, it almost seems that some sort of amnesty has been a necessary 
prerequisite for a commission to contribute to national reconciliation.”84 
The SATRC, for example, faced some of its most pointed criticism on 
this subject.85 The argument in favor of limited amnesties is that they 
help create the most complete picture as perpetrators would likely not be 
                                                                                                               
 83. Brody, supra note 32. 
 84. Charles O. Lerche III, Truth Commissions and National Reconciliation: Some 
Reflections on Theory and Practice, 7 PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. 1, 5 (2000). 
 85. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, TRUTH AND JUSTICE: UNFINISHED 
BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 5 (2003), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ 
AFR530012003ENGLISH/$File/AFR5300103.pdf [hereinafter UNFINISHED BUSINESS] 
(“Relatives of some prominent anti-apartheid victims of police brutality challenged the 
amnesty provisions in the Constitutional Court.”). See also SATRC Report, supra note 
23, ch. 1, para. 35 (“Those who have cared about the future of our country have been 
worried that the amnesty provision might, amongst other things, encourage impunity 
because it seemed to sacrifice justice.”). 
  It should be noted, however, that the SATRC did not provide for a blanket am-
nesty. As Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch explain in a jointly authored 
report: 
  The new law did not provide for a general amnesty, but a circumscribed 
process of individual applications in which those seeking immunity from 
prosecution (or release from prison) had both to show that their crime was po-
litical in motive and to make full disclosure of the acts for which they were 
seeking amnesty. A successful applicant would be permanently protected from 
any criminal or civil liability in relation to the offence acknowledged. 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra, at 4. 
  It is important to note as well that “fewer than 10% of the over 7,500 persons who 
applied [for amnesty] were actually granted amnesty. This is partly attributable to the fact 
that a high percentage of applications were from common prisoners who tried to use the 
amnesty process to secure early release.” Paula van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission’s Contribution to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 
in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 745, 753 (footnote omitted). See also Jon 
M. Van Dyke, The Fundamental Human Right to Prosecution and Compensation, 29 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 77, 88 (2001) (“As of the end of 1999, 6,037 individuals had 
applied for political amnesty, with 568 receiving pardons . . . .”). 
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forthcoming in testifying without some promise of amnesty.86 The argu-
ment against amnesties is that they encourage a culture of impunity.87 In 
some instances, the granting of amnesties may also run counter to a 
state’s obligations to punish human rights violations under international 
treaties.88 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Re-
port, however, responds eloquently to these criticisms: 
We have been concerned, too, that many consider only one aspect of 
justice. Certainly, amnesty cannot be viewed as justice if we think of 
justice only as retributive and punitive in nature. We believe, however, 
that there is another kind of justice—a restorative justice which is con-
cerned not so much with punishment as with correcting imbalances, re-
storing broken relationships—with healing, harmony and reconcilia-
tion. Such justice focuses on the experience of victims; hence the im-
portance of reparation.89 
a. Is Revealing Healing?90 
While truth commissions vary considerably, they all share the same 
central tenet that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”91 That 
is, unhealed wounds fester and it is only by bringing them to light that 
true societal reconciliation can be achieved. 92  Along with goals of 
                                                                                                               
 86. See, e.g., SATRC Report, supra note 23, ch. 5, para. 64. 
 87. See, e.g., UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 85, at 5. 
 88. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 89. SATRC Report, supra note 23, ch. 1, para. 36. 
 90. The SATRC catch phrase was “revealing is healing.” War Crimes: Bringing the 
Wicked to the Dock, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006; GILLIAN SLOVO, MAKING HISTORY: 
SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2002), http://www.open 
democracy.net/content/articles/PDF/818.pdf. 
 91. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92 (Thoemmes Press 2003) (1914) (quoting Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis). 
 92. The analogy of a society’s wounds to a wounded body requiring healing is a pow-
erful metaphor often invoked by proponents of truth commissions. The Chairperson of 
the SATRC, the Reverend Desmond M. Tutu, explained in the first of the Commission’s 
six volumes: 
  The other reason amnesia simply will not do is that the past refuses to lie 
down quietly. It has an uncanny habit of returning to haunt one. “Those who 
forget the past are doomed to repeat it” are the words emblazoned at the en-
trance to the museum in the former concentration camp of Dachau. They are 
words we would do well to keep ever in mind. However painful the experience, 
the wounds of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. 
They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they can heal. 
This is not to be obsessed with the past. It is to take care that the past is prop-
erly dealt with for the sake of the future. 
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broader societal reconciliation, truth commission proponents also point 
to psychological benefits accruing on a more individualized level.93 In-
deed, the 1995 Act establishing the SATRC set the restoration of “human 
and civil dignity of such victims by granting them an opportunity to re-
late their own accounts of the violations of which they are the victims” as 
one of the SATRC’s primary goals.94 
There are, however, two problems associated with relying on truth 
commissions to facilitate individualized healing of trauma resulting from 
state sanctioned violence. First, and quite peculiarly, it is difficult to find 
the truth in truth commissions.95 Oscar Wilde, the great Irish wit, once 
noted that “[t]he truth is seldom pure and rarely simple.”96 Though he 
                                                                                                               
SATRC Report, supra note 23, ch. 1, para. 27. See also HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE 
TERROR, supra note 68, at 133 (“Why reopen wounds that have closed? . . . Because they 
were badly closed. First you have to cure the infection, or they will reopen themselves.”) 
(quoting an Argentine journalist); ROSALIND SHAW, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, RETHINKING 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS 8 (2005), available at http://www.usip. 
org/pubs/specialreports/sr130.pdf (“Why do we come and open the wounds again? . . . 
We have to reopen the wounds because they have not healed. Superficial healing will 
allow the wounds to explode again. We have to revisit the events so that we can heal 
properly.”) (quoting Bishop Joseph Humper, the Chairman of the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). 
  Such analogies are used not only to justify truth commissions but other forms of 
transitional justice as well. In support of lustration, Václav Havel noted in an interview: 
The history of our country shows that every time we took the approach of 
thinking that we should not be interested in whatever happened in the past—
that it was not important—the consequences were always severe. It meant that 
we did not remove an ulcer that was poisoning the whole system. The ulcer 
kept festering and producing new toxins. I think that the need to cut out this ul-
cer, to administer justice, is clearly justified and natural. 
Michnik & Havel, supra, note 24, at 537. 
 93. See, e.g., Brandon Hamber, Do Sleeping Dogs Lie?: The Psychological Implica-
tions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, Seminar Paper Pre-
sented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Seminar No. 5, Johan-
nesburg, South Africa (July 26, 1995), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/ 
papsldog.htm (“Repressed pain and trauma generally block emotional life, have psycho-
logically adverse consequences and can even lead to physical symptoms.”). 
 94. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act ch. 2, para. 3(1)(c), No. 34 of 
1995, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm. See also SATRC Report, 
supra note 23, ch. 5, para. 89. 
 95. See, e.g., Kelsall, supra note 60, at 363, 380 (noting that in the proceedings of the 
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission that the author visited, “in spite of its 
injunction to victims to express the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, [the 
Commission] was rarely able to get beyond detached, factual statements on the part of 
victims and half-truths, evasions, and outright lies on the part of perpetrators”). 
 96. OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST Act 1 (1895). 
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penned those words close to a century before the first truth commissions, 
commissioners would do well to recall the aphorism. In her brilliant book 
on truth commissions, Priscilla Hayner recounts a conversation she had 
with S.K. Mbande, a South African minister. Mbande explained that in 
giving their narrative of events, some people 
stand somewhere between truth and dishonesty, because coming up 
with the whole truth is still not safe. Some give their statements be-
cause they’ve been told to do so by the government . . . . But some 
people are traumatized and fearful, and they feel it’s not safe to talk 
about it. . . . Some people have forgotten what happened, or due to 
trauma, they may tell different stories, or keep changing their story, be-
cause they can’t remember clearly.97 
A second problem is that while truth commissions may lead to national 
healing, 98  individual wounds are opened and often left untreated in 
the process.99 South African psychologist Dr. Brandon Hamber explains, 
“Psychological restoration and healing can only occur through providing 
the space for survivors to feel heard and for every detail of the traumatic 
event to be re-experienced in a safe environment.”100 Unlike traditional 
psychotherapy, truth commissions “do not offer long-term therapy; they 
offer survivors a one-time opportunity to tell their story.”101 It is ques-
                                                                                                               
 97. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 137–38. Similarly, in an 
interview with the editor of the journal African Affairs, Bishop Humper, the chairperson 
of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC) explained: 
Perpetrators will tell you truth from their own perspective . . . he will say what 
he saw . . . but he is dissociating himself . . . it may be the truth, but what is 
truth? What is partial truth? . . . In most of the cases there is some partial truth. 
The person is saying something that affects another person . . . he reserves 
within himself some of those elements that he needed to say the whole truth. . . 
. It’s truth on the surface, it’s not a deep truth. 
Kelsall, supra note 60, at 377. 
 98. Even this is debatable. See Brody, supra note 32 (“A respected poll showed that 
two-thirds of South Africans believed that the TRC investigations led to a deterioration of 
race relations.”). 
 99. Lerche, supra note 84, at 6 (“There is a popular assumption that the TRC provides 
the space for a cathartic release of emotions that can form the basis for psychological 
healing—for individual deponents and for society as a whole. But this is questionable.”). 
 100. Hamber, supra note 93. 
 101. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 135. Similarly, Dr. 
Brandon Hamber notes, “the long-term ability of a once-off statement or public testimony 
to address the full psychological impact of the past is questionable.” Brandon Hamber, 
Does the Truth Heal?: A Psychological Perspective on the Political Strategies for Deal-
ing with the Legacy of Political Violence, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND 
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tionable whether a single retelling in a public setting can truly bring 
about the psychological restoration sought.102 Indeed, as Hayner notes, 
“psychologists question the idea of a one-time catharsis resulting in real 
psychological healing. . . . [I]n fact, most therapists would avoid pushing 
someone to address the worst of their pain too quickly, especially if it is 
rooted in events of extreme trauma.”103 While truth commissions unde-
niably give some victims a sense of closure,104 they serve to severely 
traumatize others.105 As the assistant director of the Trauma Center for 
Victims of Violence and Torture, a non-governmental organization 
(“NGO”) in Cape Town, South Africa, has explained, the commission 
“opens the patient up and then walks away. In some ways, they feel they 
are just being used as a public spectacle.”106 
The fact that testifying before a truth commission may grant some vic-
tims the closure for which they have long been searching, while a similar 
experience only serves to retraumatize others should come as little sur-
prise, for individuals reconcile pain in profoundly personal ways. Indeed, 
as volume one of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Af-
rica Report acknowledges, “the reconciliation of victims with their own 
pain is a deeply personal, complex and unpredictable process. . . . Truth 
may, in fact, cause further alienation.”107 
While the fact that not all victims would be served by a truth commis-
sion is hardly surprising, what is surprising is that concerns exist that 
truth commissions (especially those that fail to implement a social ser-
                                                                                                               
DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 155, 160 (Nigel Biggar ed., expanded and updated 
ed. 2003). 
 102. See, e.g., HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 140 (“Given 
the great number of victims that come forward and the short period of time that a com-
mission has to complete its work, truth commissions to date have not been able to offer 
any serious psychological support services, nor generally to respond well to the occa-
sional follow-up phone calls of distress . . . .”). 
 103. Id. at 139. 
 104. See, e.g., id. (“Emotionally it helped a great deal. It helped me to come to terms 
with it. But physically it hasn’t helped. I still have bullets in my chest, I’m still in pain. 
But emotionally it has helped a great deal.”) (quoting one South African survivor who 
had been shot during a political march). 
 105. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, In Apartheid Inquiry, Agony Is Relived but Not Put to 
Rest, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1997, at A1 (“It was very traumatic to relive it . . . . Now, I can 
actually see it in my mind. Before the hearing I never cried. But now, I cry all the time” 
and “It was like—speak to the Truth Commission and you will be reconciled. . . . But it’s 
not that way. That did not happen. I just cry all the time now. How do you reconcile? 
How?”) (quoting one victim of the apartheid regime who testified before the SATRC). 
 106. Id. 
 107. SATRC Report, supra note 23, ch. 5, para. 14. 
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vices justice component)108 may actually do more harm than good. While 
no comprehensive study on the psychological impact of truth commis-
sions on victims has yet been undertaken,109 “officials of the Trauma 
Center for Victims of Violence and Torture . . . say 50 to 60 percent of 
the dozens of victims they have talked to in the last year have said they 
suffered difficulties after testifying or expressed regret.”110 As Hayner 
concludes, “[t]here has been no study to date . . . but the evidence that is 
available is enough to raise some serious questions.”111 
2. Justice: A Duty to Prosecute? 
In contrast to truth commissions, prosecution through criminal trials 
holds perpetrators directly accountable for their actions. Criminal trials 
serve distinct functions relative to non-judicial mechanisms,112 and many 
                                                                                                               
 108. Social services justice focuses on the social, economic, and medical components 
of providing justice to victims. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Beyond Retribution and Impunity: 
Responding to War Crimes of Sexual Violence, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 217, 247–49 
(2005). 
 109. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 135. 
 110. Daley, supra note 105. See also HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra 
note 68, at 138 (“It’s true that the truth commission is a healing process—if not 100 per-
cent, then 60 percent.”) (quoting Reverend S.K. Mbande). When Hayner asked the Rev-
erend whether the sixty percent referred to the percentage of people who were healed or 
the percentage to which each person was healed, he replied: “Both. Perhaps 60 percent 
feel better, but those people are only healed 60 percent.” Id. 
 111. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 135. 
 112. The Swiss Peace Foundation explains: 
Trials communicate that a culture of impunity which permitted abuses is being 
replaced by a culture of accountability, giving a sense of security to victims and 
a warning to those who might contemplate future abuses. They provide some 
redress for the suffering of victims and help to curtail the inclination towards 
vigilante justice. . . . [I]n the context of recent intra-societal conflicts, criminal 
trials make the important statement that specific individuals have committed 
the crimes in question and are therefore to be held accountable, not entire eth-
nic or religious groups—thereby repudiating notions of collective blame and 
guilt that can otherwise be used to foment the next round of violence. 
Dealing with the Past, supra note 59, at 18. 
  The Secretary General’s 2004 report on transitional justice explains: 
  Criminal trials can play an important role in transitional contexts. They ex-
press public denunciation of criminal behaviour. They can provide a direct 
form of accountability for perpetrators and ensure a measure of justice for vic-
tims by giving them a chance to see their former tormentors made to answer for 
their crimes. Insofar as relevant procedural rules enable them to present their 
views and concerns at trial, they can also help victims to reclaim their dignity. 
Secretary-General’s Report on Transitional Justice, supra note 79, ¶ 39. 
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scholars believe that they are the best mechanism for developing the rule 
of law in post-conflict societies.113 The view also exists that punishment 
for gross human rights violations is not only preferable to non-judicial 
mechanisms but may be mandatory under international treaties to which 
a state is a signatory.114 
                                                                                                               
 113. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The 
Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 18 (1996) (“The relevance of 
prosecution and other accountability measures to the pursuit of peace is that through their 
effective application they serve as deterrence, and thus prevent future victimization.”); 
Jamal Benomar, Justice After Transitions, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 
33 (“Punishing perpetrators of past abuses can thus serve not only as a symbolic break 
with the ugly legacy of authoritarian rule, but also as an affirmation of adherence to new 
democratic values.”); Richard J. Goldstone, Ethnic Reconciliation Needs the Help of a 
Truth Commission, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 24, 1998, at 6 (“For without justice and the 
rule of law, it is far too easy for mankind to fall into a self-destructive Hobbesian state of 
anarchical survival of the fittest. Through a robust tribunal process, the international 
community can demonstrate to those who would contemplate committing such horrific 
crimes—whether in Bosnia or elsewhere—that they will pay a price.”); Samuel P. Hunt-
ington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, in 1 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 68 (“Prosecution is necessary to assert the su-
premacy of democratic values and norms and to encourage the public to believe in 
them.”); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 25 (1998) (“To re-
spond to mass atrocity with legal prosecutions is to embrace the rule of law.”); Diane F. 
Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2542 (1991) (“Trials may, as well, inspire societies 
that are reexamining their basic values to affirm the fundamental principles of respect for 
the rule of law and for the inherent dignity of individuals.”); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest 
We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 321, 393 (1999) (“Law must come first and enforcement of law is a prerequisite 
to respect for the law.”). 
 114. This argument is made forcefully by Diane F. Orentlicher, who served as General 
Counsel to the International League for Human Rights. Orentlicher argues that “explicit 
obligations to punish human rights crimes . . . are established by the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide . . . and the Convention Against 
Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . . . .” Or-
entlicher, supra note 113, at 2562. 
  For example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide states: 
  Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 
III [(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public in-
citement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity 
in genocide] shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory 
of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may 
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have ac-
cepted its jurisdiction. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. VI, adopted 
Dec. 9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260 A (III), 78 U.N.T.S 227. 
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On the other hand, there are severe limitations with a post-conflict sys-
tem of justice that only employs prosecutions. First and foremost, sys-
tematic human rights violations are never carried out by a single group of 
individuals. Rather, thousands of individuals were responsible for trans-
forming Iraq into a republic of fear,115 just as thousands were responsible 
for committing genocide in Rwanda116 and thousands were responsible 
                                                                                                               
  The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture”) states: 
  1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its 
criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an 
act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture. 
  2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate pen-
alties which take into account their grave nature. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment art. 4, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
Convention Against Torture]. 
  Iraq ratified the Genocide Convention on Jan. 20, 1959. Office of the United Na-
tions High Comm’r for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr. 
org/english/bodies/ratification/1.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). As of Oct. 23, 2007, 
Iraq has not ratified the Convention Against Torture. See Office of the United Nations 
High Comm’r for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/ 
english/bodies/ratification/9.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). Despite Iraq’s failure to 
ratify the Convention Against Torture, several human rights scholars have argued that the 
prohibition of torture is a jus cogens principle, a nonderogable duty. See, e.g., M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996) (“The legal literature discloses that the following inter-
national crimes are jus cogens: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices, and torture.”). The Ninth Circuit has 
also held that the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens principle. See Pamela J. Stephens, 
A Categorical Approach to Human Rights Claims: Jus Cogens as a Limitation on En-
forcement?, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 245, 255 (2004) (“[T]he [N]inth [C]ircuit held that the 
‘prohibition against official torture “carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm,” which 
“enjoys the highest status within international law.”’”). 
  Similarly, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 115. See MAKIYA, supra note 2, at xi (“The Ba’th developed the politics of fear into an 
art form, one that ultimately served the purpose of legitimizing their rule by making large 
numbers of people complicit in the violence of the regime.”). 
 116. As Neil Kritz writes: 
In Rwanda, after ousting a regime that organized genocidal killings of at least 
half a million people, if the new government were to undertake prosecution of 
every person who participated in this heinous butchery, some 30,000–100,000 
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for carrying out the Holocaust—a fact made clear in Hannah Arendt’s 
brilliant Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil,117 
covering Nazi Adolph Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem. As one writer ex-
plains: 
Arendt concluded that far from exhibiting a malevolent hatred of Jews 
which could have accounted psychologically for his participation in the 
Holocaust, Eichmann was an utterly innocuous individual. He operated 
unthinkingly, following orders, efficiently carrying them out, with no 
consideration of their effects upon those he targeted. The human di-
mension of these activities were not entertained, so the extermination of 
the Jews became indistinguishable from any other bureaucratically as-
signed and discharged responsibility for Eichmann and his cohorts.118 
Nonetheless, due to limited resources, prosecutions are “[in]capable of 
touching more than the tip of this iceberg; they have the capacity to 
prosecute only a tiny percentage of potential defendants.”119 This in turn 
                                                                                                               
Rwandan citizens could be placed in the dock—a situation that would be 
wholly unmanageable and extremely destabilizing to the transition. 
Kritz, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, supra note 16, at xxiii. 
 117. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE 
BANALITY OF EVIL (rev. & enlarged ed. 1965). 
 118. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/arendt.htm#H6 (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). 
 119. Dealing with the Past, supra note 59, at 21. Indeed, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (“SCSL”) was expected to prosecute less than twenty individuals over four years. 
Kritz, Progress and Humility, supra note 82, at 68. 
  In an innovative attempt at transitional justice, Rwanda instituted the gacaca 
courts in June 2002. Maya Goldstein Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in 
Transitional Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355, 355 (2004). Gacaca literally means “the 
lawn or grass where communities assemble to resolve community disputes.” Id. at n.1. As 
Bolocan writes, gacaca “blend[s] retributive and restorative [justice] approaches in an 
innovative way . . . [by] seek[ing] justice in an open, accessible, and participatory fash-
ion.” Id. at 356. Under gacaca, over 250,000 community elected “judges” are expected to 
hear 115,000 cases of prison detainees accused of crimes in the 1994 genocide. See, e.g., 
Marc Sommers & Elizabeth McClintock, On Hidden Ground: One Coexistence Strategy 
in Central Africa, in IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER VIOLENT 
ETHNIC CONFLICT 35, 44–45 (Antonia Chayes & Martha Minow eds., 2003). The accused 
will return to the scene of the crime and local residents may offer evidence in the hopes 
of disclosing the truth of what occurred. Id. at 45. Punishments for those found guilty by 
a gacaca court range from imprisonment to community service to paying restitution to a 
victim’s family. See, e.g., Craig Timberg, In Rwanda, Suicides Haunt Search for Justice 
and Closure, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, at A1. 
  While Rwanda should be applauded for taking an important step toward national 
reconciliation, gacaca has come under criticism. Amnesty International has expressed 
concern about the judges’ competency, claiming “[t]he abbreviated training they have 
received is grossly inadequate to the task at hand, given the complex nature and context 
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may foster impunity and serve to undermine reconciliation.120 A second 
concern with prosecutions is that a nation emerging from a protracted 
conflict is too “fragile . . . to survive the destabilizing effects of politi-
cally charged trials.”121 
If a nation chooses to prosecute perpetrators, it must take caution not to 
run counter to principles implicit in a democratic legal order. One such 
principle is that of nulla poena sine lege. This concept is defined as “[n]o 
punishment without a law authorizing it.”122 As Professor Teitel explains, 
“[t]his principle against retroactivity in the operation of criminal justice 
requires that as a matter of fairness persons ought not to be held account-
able for offenses not known to be unlawful at the time they were com-
                                                                                                               
of the crimes committed during the genocide.” Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda: Gacaca – Gam-
bling with Justice, AI Index AFR 47/003/2002 (June 19, 2002), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR470032002!Open. The same report also 
notes that “[p]re-gacaca trial sessions observed by Amnesty International delegates in 
2001 were marked by intimidation and haranguing by officials of defendants, defence 
witnesses and local populations.” Id. Finally, critics have expressed procedural concerns. 
See, e.g., Sarah L. Wells, Gender, Sexual Violence and Prospects for Justice at the 
Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 167, 169 (2005) (“[A] 
lack of regard for the due process rights of the accused will inhibit gacaca’s contribution 
to post-conflict justice . . . .”). 
  Gacaca has been the subject of much scholarship. See generally Christina M. 
Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass 
Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163 (2000); Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: 
Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 41 (2005); Jessica Raper, The 
Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda’s Restorative Dispute Resolution Response to the 1994 
Genocide, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2005); L. Danielle Tully, Note, Human Rights 
Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385 
(2003); Lars Waldorf, Views from the Field, XIX PRAXIS: THE FLETCHER J. OF INT’L 
DEV. 137 (2004). 
 120. Contra BORELLO, supra note 77, at 16 (“International law and international juris-
prudence have been evolving toward the principle that ‘those bearing the greatest degree 
of responsibility’ . . . should be prosecuted.”). The concept of prosecuting those “who 
bear the greatest responsibility” is also enshrined in Article 1 of the Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1(1) (2000), 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html. 
 121. Orentlicher, supra note 113, at 2544 (“Many countries emerging from dictatorship 
are polarized and unstable, and may be further fractured by prosecutions of the prior re-
gime’s depredations.”) (footnote omitted). 
 122. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999). Nulla 
poena sine lege is also enshrined in Article XXIII of the International Criminal Court. 
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 23, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002. 
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mitted.”123 While genocide and torture were clearly unlawful under the 
Ba’ath regime in Iraq, merely being a member of the Ba’ath party was 
not. Lustration laws (considered in Part II) that seek to impose legal dis-
abilities on former members generally run counter to this important prin-
ciple. 
D. From Competition to Compatibility: A Holistic Approach to Transi-
tional Justice 
During the 1990s, disputes over “truth versus justice” were familiar 
and arose from the belief that the two mechanisms were in competition 
for finite resources and incompatible with one another. The contest over 
the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission in Bosnia is one 
such example. Although the idea of a Bosnian truth and reconciliation 
commission enjoyed wide support from local NGOs, senior International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) officials disap-
proved of the enterprise and, in the words of Neil J. Kritz, “aggressively 
blocked the project, and did so in ways that arguably exceeded the Tri-
bunal’s mandate and displayed a disdain for local players and concerns 
that international institutions of justice must avoid in the future.”124 No-
tably, the ICTY’s former chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone argued in 
1998 that “the two processes serve distinct functions and can be com-
plementary,”125 but such thoughtful views were few and far between in 
the 1990s. 
                                                                                                               
 123. Schulhofer et al., supra note 12, at 20. See also Kritz, Dilemmas of Transitional 
Justice, supra note 16, at xxii (“[T]he reality is that many of the acts that [countries 
emerging from repressive regimes] desire to punish today were not crimes when they 
were committed under the former regime; they were often laudable and encouraged under 
the old system.”). 
 124. Kritz, Progress and Humility, supra note 82, at 62. Kritz notes that ICTY con-
cerns included: 
(1) The TRC would get in the way of the work of the ICTY . . . . (2) Multiple 
statements by the same individual to the two bodies might contain inconsisten-
cies that could be used by a defense attorney to impugn the ICTY testimony of 
the witness. (3) The TRC could be a source of competition for international re-
sources and local attention. (4) The combination of the ICTY and the TRC 
would be confusing to those who are obliged to live with the legacy of the past 
on a day-to-day basis in the region. 
Id. See also Dealing with the Past, supra note 59, at 29 (“[T]he idea . . . was initially 
blocked by senior officials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via, who effectively mobilized the international community to stop the domestic effort in 
its tracks.”). 
 125. Goldstone, supra note 113. 
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Quite fortunately, as the Swiss Peace Foundation notes, “attitudes on 
this issue have evolved”126 and “experience has shown that the question 
is not which takes priority, but how to combine and sequence a ‘package’ 
of measures that allow the maximum possible of justice, truth-telling, 
reparations to victims and structural reforms.”127 Two nations in particu-
lar, East Timor and Sierra Leone, have taken holistic approaches to tran-
sitional justice by combining “peace” and “justice.”128 
In the summer of 2001, the United Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (“UNTAET”) created the Commission for Reception, 
Truth, and Reconciliation (“CRTR”). 129  The CRTR was designed to 
complement the larger prosecution plan and has largely succeeded in this 
regard. As one scholar notes, “the CRTR is part and parcel of a broader 
justice and reconciliation model working on the basis of interdependent 
and complementary prosecution.”130 Also in 2001, the war-ravaged na-
tion of Sierra Leone131 became the first country to launch a Truth and 
                                                                                                               
 126. Dealing with the Past, supra note 59, at 29 (“[T]he current leadership of the ICTY 
[has endorsed] the TRC proposal as an important, complementary mechanism to help 
Bosnia to deal with its recent past in a healthy way.”). 
 127. Id. at 33. 
 128. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and 
National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission in East Timor, 95 A.J.I.L 952, 954 
(2001) (considering the establishment of a truth commission in East Timor and conclud-
ing “truth commissions have gradually developed into a justice-supportive machinery, 
designed to complement rather than replace national or international prosecution”). 
 129. See United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UNTAET/REG/ 
2001/10, Part II, 13 July 2001. 
 130. Stahn, supra note 128, at 953. 
 131. Contemporary intra-state conflicts are often marked by egregious human rights 
violations and tend to more deleteriously impact civilians (particularly women and chil-
dren) than inter-state conflicts. See, e.g., Abiodun Alao, The Role of African Regional 
and Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Prevention and Resolution (Office of  
the United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Working Paper No. 23, 2000), 
http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0c88.pdf. One explanation for this is 
that many rebel forces, particularly those in African conflicts, are unable to rely upon 
tactical skills and therefore must rely on terror. See, e.g., Tony Clayton, African Military 
Capabilities in Insurrection, Intervention and Peace Support Operations, in AFRICAN 
INTERVENTIONIST STATES 51, 54–55 (Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001). Sierra 
Leone’s vicious decade-long civil war was a study in terror. During the war, 50,000–
200,000 people were killed. War Crimes: Bringing the Wicked to the Dock, supra note 
90. Moreover, in a war waged by attacks on the civilian population, one scholar explains, 
“thousands more were defenseless victims of ‘terror tactics,’ including, abduction, rape, 
carving of messages into chests and backs of victims, and amputation of hands and feet, 
leaving victims physically disfigured and psychologically scarred.” Jennifer L. Poole, 
Post-Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 563, 
564–65 (footnote omitted). 
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  The war began on March 23, 1991 when a guerrilla organization, the Revolution-
ary United Front (“RUF”), armed by Liberia’s Charles Taylor, invaded Sierra Leone from 
Liberia with the goal of overthrowing the government. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, 
Getting Away with Murder: Mutilation, Rape, New Testimony from Sierra Leone 8 
(Working Paper, Vol. 11, No. 3(A), July 1999). While the RUF initially “set forth a 
vaguely populist agenda of fighting against government officials and their business asso-
ciates in Freetown who had plundered the country’s resources,” such revolutionary zeal 
quickly dissipated and spiraled into a campaign of terror. JOHN L. HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: 
DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 31 (2001). Although all sides in the con-
flict committed egregious human rights violations, the RUF became known for monstrous 
acts committed against civilians, particularly amputating limbs, the RUF’s signature. As a 
1998 Human Rights Watch paper reports, “gross violations of human rights committed 
by the AFRC/RUF . . . included amputations by machete of one or both hands, arms, feet, 
legs, ears and buttocks and one or more fingers; lacerations to the head, neck, arms, legs, 
feet and torso; the gouging out of one or both eyes.” Human Rights Watch, Sowing Ter-
ror: Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone 1 (Working Paper, Vol. 10, No. 3(A), 
July 1998). Children suffered enormously during the war, perhaps more than in any other 
contemporary armed conflict. A 2004 child friendly version of the Sierra Leone Truth 
and Reconciliation Report produced with the support of the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (“UNICEF”) notes: 
  Children of this country were forced to fight for a cause we could not under-
stand. We were drugged and made to kill and destroy our brothers and sisters 
and our mothers and fathers. We were beaten, amputated and used as sex 
slaves. This was a wretched display of inhuman and immoral actions by those 
who were supposed to be protecting us. Our hands, which were meant to be 
used freely for play and schoolwork, were used instead, by force, to burn, kill 
and destroy. 
UNICEF, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report for the Children of Sierra Leone, 
at 3 (2004), http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/TRCCF9SeptFINAL.pdf.   
  A military stalemate gave way to the 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement, but as John 
L. Hirsch writes in his masterly study of Sierra Leone, “[n]o sooner was the Abidjan 
Agreement signed than the nascent peace process began to break down.” HIRSCH, supra, 
at 54. The RUF refused to disarm as required by the Agreement and within two years the 
rebels were on the brink of taking the capital of Freetown. Id. at 71. Ultimately, the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (“ECOMOG”) succeeded in 
pushing the rebels out of Freetown, thereby paving the way once again for renewed peace 
talks. Id. at 63. On July 7, 1999, in the city of Lomé, Togo, the Lomé Peace Agreement 
was signed by the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. See Peace Agreement Be-
tween the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinaf-
ter Lomé Agreement]. Despite its intention to observe a “total and permanent cessation of 
hostilities” by signing the agreement, the RUF refused to abide by the terms and in May 
2000, seized some 500 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (“UNAMSIL”) peace-
keepers, who had replaced the ECOMOG troops. HIRSCH, supra, at 87. The British gov-
ernment reacted with an ambitious military offensive that served to strengthen the resolve 
of the peacekeepers and within a year, the RUF had resumed the disarmament process 
detailed in the Lomé Agreement. Poole, supra, at 572–73.  
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  The Lomé Agreement contained a detailed plan for disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (“DDR”), the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(“SLTRC”), and a timetable for national elections. See Lomé Agreement, supra, arts. 
XVI, XXVI(1), XII. The Lomé Agreement was not without controversy, however. Article 
III of the Agreement allowed the RUF to become an accepted political party. Id. art. III. 
Article IX traded justice for peace by granting a blanket amnesty for all crimes commit-
ted by parties, including the RUF, during the war “[t]o consolidate the peace and promote 
the cause of national reconciliation.” Id. art. IX(3). Critically, at the last minute, the Sec-
retary-General’s Special Representative to Sierra Leone, Ambassador Francis Okelo, 
added a disclaimer to the agreement stating that “[t]he United Nations interprets that the 
amnesty and pardon in article nine of this agreement shall not apply to international 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.” Human Rights Watch, The Sierra Leone Amnesty Under 
International Law (Aug. 3, 1999), http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/int-law2.htm. 
Although this disclaimer had the effect of dismantling the legal impact of the amnesty 
provision, international human rights organizations, who did not have to deal with the 
consequences of the war, decried the amnesty. Sierra Leoneans, on the other hand, recog-
nized the painful reality that without the amnesty provision the war would continue. As 
such, they were willing to sacrifice justice for peace. See, e.g., Karen Gallagher, No Jus-
tice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON 
L. REV. 149, 165 (2000). See also Corinna Schuler, Sierra Leone’s ‘See No Evil’ Pact, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 15, 1999, at 1 (“Some 200 representatives of civil 
society—groups of women, church leaders, students—agreed to the amnesty provisions 
at a national conference.”). 
 132. Per Article XXVI of the Lomé Agreement, the SLTRC was established with the 
following mandate: 
[T]o create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human 
rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra 
Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome 
Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, 
to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the viola-
tions and abuses suffered. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act § 6(1) (2000), available at 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html. 
  The SLTRC was composed of seven individuals, four Sierra Leoneans and three 
non-citizens. Id. at § 3(1). Operationally, the work of the Commission was conducted in 
three phases: a deployment phase; a hearings phase; and a report-writing phase. Sixth 
Weekly Briefing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Aug. 28, 2002), 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcbriefing082802.html. The SLTRC “worked tirelessly” for 
two years, taking the statements of over 7,000 people. Press Release, U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council [ECOSOC], Final Report on Ten-Year Sierra Leone Conflict Published; Seeks to 
Set Out Historical Record, Offer Guidance for Future, U.N. Doc. ECOSOC/6140  
(Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter ECOSOC Press Release], available at http://www.un.org/ 
News/Press/docs/2004/ecosoc6140.doc.htm. As children were disproportionately im-
pacted by the conflict, the Commission made particular efforts to include the views of 
children. See id. The SLTRC was funded primarily by international donors. William A. 
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Schabas, The Relationship Between Truth Commissions and International Courts: The 
Case of Sierra Leone, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1035, 1039 (2003). Although initially budgeted at 
$10 million, the SLTRC had to make do with less than half that amount. Id. 
  The SLTRC released its final report in October 2004. The report consists of 1,500 
pages and a 3,500 page annex. ECOSOC Press Release, supra. As the International Cen-
ter for Transitional Justice notes, the report “provides an account of the abuses committed 
during the civil war, sets out the Commission’s findings, and makes recommendations on 
how the country can address its past and move forward.” Press Release, Int’l Ctr. for 
Transitional Justice, Sierra Leone Truth Commission Final Report Released (Oct. 5, 
2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/en/news/press/release/465.html. The SLTRC also 
recommended “address [ing] the needs of the victims” through a reparations program. 
See 2 THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA 
LEONE chap. 4 (2004). 
  For criticism of the SLTRC, see SHAW, supra note 92, at 4 (“[T]here was little 
popular support for bringing the Commission to Sierra Leone, since most people favored 
instead a ‘forgive and forget’ approach. . . . But there was a very strong vocal minority 
that thought that people needed to talk about what happened.”). 
 133. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), 
created by Security Council Resolution 827 (May 25, 1993), and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, created by Security Council Resolution 955 (Nov. 8, 1994), the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) is a “treaty-based sui generis court.” See, e.g., 
Poole, supra note 131, at 583. As a member of the International Criminal Court Prepara-
tory Commission notes, it is “the first ad hoc criminal tribunal based upon an agreement 
between the United Nations and the government of a member state.” Micaela Frulli, The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments, 11 E.J.I.L. 833, 833 
(2000). The SCSL has its antecedent in a letter the President of Sierra Leone sent to the 
Secretary-General. As Annan notes in his Fifth Report on UNAMSIL, “[i]n a letter ad-
dressed to me dated 12 June, President Kabbah requested United Nations assistance to 
establish a special court to try Foday Sankoh and other senior members of RUF ‘for 
crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of United Nations peace-
keepers as hostages.’” The Secretary-General, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶ 9, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2000/751 (July 13, 2000). In his letter, President Kabbah indicated that the crimes 
were so serious as to be “of concern to all persons in the world.” Richard S. Williamson, 
Transitional Justice: The UN and the Sierra Leone Special Court, 2 CARDOZO PUBL. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 5 (2003) (quoting President Alhaji Ahmed Tehan Kabbah to Kofi 
Annan (June 12, 2000)). Two weeks later, the Security Council responded with Resolu-
tion 1315, which requested that the Secretary-General “negotiate an agreement with the 
Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court consistent with th[e] 
resolution.” S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). With regard to 
the legality of the amnesty granted in Article IX of the Lomé Agreement, the United Na-
tions specifically addressed this matter with the following: 
  While recognizing that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a gesture of 
peace and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an internal armed conflict, 
the United Nations has consistently maintained the position that amnesty can-
not be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
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The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone, ¶ 22, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). 
  Three aspects of the SCSL are particularly noteworthy. First, the court is a “hy-
brid” in that it is composed of both international and domestic judges, prosecutors, and 
defense counsels, and sits in Sierra Leone. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone art. 12. The judges are appointed by both the Government of Sierra Leone and by 
the United Nations. Id. art. 12(1)(a). The prosecutor is appointed for a three-year term by 
the United Nations while the deputy prosecutor is appointed by the Government of Sierra 
Leone. Id. art. 15(3). For the benefits that a “hybrid” court may offer international crimi-
nal law, see Laura A. Dickinson, Note, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
295, 303 (2003) (“Purely domestic and purely international institutions may also fail to 
promote local capacity-building, which is often an urgent priority in postconflict situa-
tions.”). See also Michael Lieberman, Salvaging the Remains: The Khmer Rouge Tribu-
nal on Trial, 186 MIL. L. R. 164, 165 (2006) (citing possible benefits of hybrid courts, 
including “combining the expertise and integrity of international personnel” with local 
ownership, “reduced expenses, easier access to witnesses and evidence, and the potential 
for local capacity building”). See also Frulli, supra, at 835 (arguing that hybrid courts 
involve the members state to a greater extent in the “establishment, composition, and 
functioning” of the court). 
  Second, the SCSL has jurisdiction over both international and domestic crimes. 
Articles 2–4 confer jurisdiction to the SCSL over crimes against humanity, violations of 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and “[o]ther serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law.” Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 2–4. Article 5 confers 
jurisdiction to the SCSL over crimes under Sierra Leonean law. Id. art. 5. The SCSL’s 
jurisdiction extends to noncitizens as well as citizens, and to persons who were fifteen 
years of age at the time of the crime’s commission. Id. art. 7(1). While extension of the 
SCSL’s jurisdiction to children of this age initially garnered international opprobrium, the 
SCSL Statute emphasizes rehabilitation over retribution when dealing with juveniles. For 
example, Article 7(2) states then when trying a case against a juvenile, any of the follow-
ing would be a proper disposition: “care guidance and supervision orders, community 
service orders, counselling, foster care, correctional, educational and vocational training 
programmes, approved schools and, as appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration or programmes of child protection agencies.” Id. at 7(2). 
  Third, the SCSL placed a great emphasis on local outreach, conducted through 
town hall meetings, transparent communication with media, and consistent sharing of 
information with civil society organizations. UNITED STATES INST. OF PEACE, BUILDING 
THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 3 (2004), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr122.pdf [herein-
after BUILDING THE IST]. As the United States Institute of Peace (“USIP”) notes, “the 
strong emphasis on outreach . . . is considered to have contributed significantly to its 
credibility among the local population” and should be a model for other tribunals. Id. 
  As of this writing, eleven individuals representing the three warring factions have 
been indicted by the SCSL. Three trials of nine accused have progressed simultaneously. 
On February 28, 2004, the trial court ordered the joint trials of three members of the Civil 
Defense Force (“CDF”). CDF Trial, Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-
sl.org/CDF.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2007). On August 2, 2007, two of the defendants 
were found guilty on several counts each (the third defendant died during the trial). Id. 
The joint trial against three former RUF members began on July 5, 2004. RUF Trial, 
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thus providing, in the words of Professor William Schabas, “the evolving 
discipline of transitional justice with a laboratory in which to examine 
how the two bodies . . . relate to each other.”135 Despite initial concerns 
that the existence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) would 
prevent individuals from testifying to the Sierra Leone Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission for fear that their testimony would be used against 
them at the SCSL, such fears have generally proved unfounded.136 Sierra 
                                                                                                               
Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/RUF.html (last visited Sept. 26, 
2007). Indictments against two other RUF members (including the notorious Foday Say-
bana Sankoh) were withdrawn on December 8, 2003 due to the two individuals’ deaths. 
Id. The joint trial of three former Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (“AFRC”) mem-
bers began on Mar. 7, 2005. AFRC Trial, Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-
sl.org/AFRC.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2007). One other AFRC member, Johnny Paul 
Koroma, remains at large. See OFFICE OF PRESS AND PUB. AFFAIRS, SPECIAL COURT FOR 
SIERRA LEONE, PAMPHLET, BASIC FACTS, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/basic 
factspamphlet.pdf. In what was a momentous coup for transitional justice, the infamous 
former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was captured on March 29, 2006 following a 
request by Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf that Nigerian authorities apprehend 
Taylor. See Craig Timberg, Liberian President Backs Bid To Move Taylor Trial to 
Hague, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at A15. In his first appearance before the SCSL, 
Taylor defiantly pleaded not guilty. See, e.g., Hans Nichols & Lydia Polgreen, Liberia 
Ex-Leader Faces War-Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006, at A3 (“I think this is an 
attempt to divide and rule the people of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and so most definitely I 
am not guilty.”) (quoting Charles Taylor). Whether Taylor will remain at the SCSL is 
anyone’s guess. Fearing concerns that a Taylor trial may further destabilize a fragile na-
tion, the SCSL has requested that Taylor be moved to a courtroom in the Hague. Taylor, 
on the other hand, has vowed to fight any move, claiming that he can only receive a fair 
hearing in Sierra Leone. Id. 
 134. For an examination of the collaboration and coordination between the SLTRC and 
the SCSL, see Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship be-
tween the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 139 (2003); Elizabeth M. Evenson, Note, Truth and Jus-
tice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between Commission and Court, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
730 (2004). 
 135. Schabas, supra note 132, at 1065. 
 136. Beth K. Dougherty, for example, examined a study undertaken by a Sierra 
Leonean NGO on ex-combatants’ views toward the SLTRC. Dougherty found: 
  Concern about the SCSL and fears for their security . . . initially kept ex-
combatant participation low. But as the hearings went on, and the SCSL did not 
pursue those who testified, more and more ex-combatants came forward. Many 
ex-combatants wanted to return to their communities but were afraid of their 
reception; participating in the TRC was a means of easing the path of reintegra-
tion. In at least four districts, perpetrators (mostly RUF) came forward and pub-
licly asked forgiveness. By the end, an unprecedented 13% of individual state-
ments came from perpetrators, and “approximately a third of those who ap-
peared in hearings admitted to their own wrongs, often in great detail.” 
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Leone has learned that “mass atrocities . . . generally expose and/or pro-
duce complex problems and rifts in society which are resistant to simple, 
one-step solutions; they typically require sophisticated, multi-faceted and 
well-integrated responses.”137 Hopefully, Sierra Leone is not the last na-
tion to learn this lesson. In the words of a 2006 article in The Economist, 
“the wounded little country’s bold experiment could set a trend.”138 
E. The Need for Reparations 
An important component of transitional justice is the awarding of repa-
rations to victims of state-sponsored human rights violations.139 Gener-
ally, reparations “refers to compensation, usually of a material kind and 
often specifically monetary, for some past wrong.”140 Reparations may, 
however, take several forms,141 including non-monetary awards.142 Prin-
                                                                                                               
Beth K. Dougherty, Searching for Answers: Sierra Leone’s Truth & Reconciliation 
Commission, 8 AFR. STUD. Q. 39, 48 (2004). See also Schabas, supra note 132, at 1051 
(“As the TRC hearings progressed . . . many perpetrators came forward to tell their sto-
ries to the Commission . . . . They did not appear at all concerned about the threat of 
prosecution by the Special Court. Prhaps [sic] they had already understood that the Spe-
cial Court was only concerned with ‘big fish’ . . . .”). But see SHAW, supra note 92, at 4 
(“Ex-combatant fears about the passage of information from the TRC to the Special 
Court in fact appear to have been partly justified. This is not because of any deliberate 
intent, but because of leakages that may be inevitable when two forms of transitional 
justice operate concurrently.”). 
 137. Dealing with the Past, supra note 59, at 29. 
 138. War Crimes: Bringing the Wicked to the Dock, supra note 90. 
 139. See, e.g., HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 170–82. 
 140. Torpey, supra note 23, at 3. 
 141. The Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, by the United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council, notes that reparations generally take one of four 
forms: restitution (“to re-establish the situation that existed prior to the violations of hu-
man rights and humanitarian law”); compensation (which “provide[s] for any economi-
cally assessable damage resulting from violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law”); rehabilitation (which “provide[s] and will include medical and psychological care 
as well as legal and social services”); and “[s]atisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition.” ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. On Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minori-
ties, Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Vic-
tims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, ¶¶ 12–15, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 (May 24, 1996) (prepared by Theo van Boven). 
  Generally, a combination of these types is necessary to adequately remunerate 
victims. See, e.g., Secretary General’s Report on Transitional Justice, supra note 79, ¶ 
55 (“No single form of reparation is likely to be satisfactory to victims. Instead, appropri-
ately conceived combinations of reparation measures will usually be required . . . .”). 
 142. See, e.g., UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 85, at 8 (“[T]he TRC made extensive 
recommendations for . . . various forms of ‘symbolic’ reparations, ranging from the 
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ciples guiding reparations for breaches of international obligations date 
back to at least 1928143 and today states have an unambiguous duty to 
grant reparations to victims of gross human rights violations.144 
Reparations serve two primary functions. First, on the most basic level, 
victims of human rights violations “often suffer a range of physical and 
psychological injuries and sometimes live under extreme economic con-
ditions as a result of the loss of the breadwinner in the family, the de-
struction of property, or their physical inability to work.”145 Reparations 
therefore help victims “manage the material aspect of their loss.” 146 
Reparations also serve to “deter the state from future abuses.”147 
Three difficulties can be identified in the administration of reparations. 
First, few transitioning states have the funds to compensate all the vic-
tims deserving of assistance. In South Africa, the President’s Fund for 
overseas donations was established but was poorly funded. 148  Other 
                                                                                                               
building of monuments and renaming streets and community facilities, to expunging 
criminal records for acts committed with political motives.”). 
 143. In the 1928 Chorzów Factory case, involving a claim by Germany against Poland 
concerning the expropriation of a factory, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
held: 
  The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act—a 
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particu-
lar by the decisions of arbitral tribunals—is that reparation must, as far as pos-
sible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situa-
tion which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been com-
mitted. 
The Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 
13). 
 144. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3)(a), Mar. 
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) 
To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity . . . .”). 
  The Convention Against Torture has a similar provision. Article 14 states: 
  1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of 
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate com-
pensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event 
of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be 
entitled to compensation. 
Convention Against Torture, supra note 114, art. 14. 
 145. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 170. 
 146. Kritz, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, supra note 16, at xxvii. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 85, at 9; HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE 
TERROR, supra note 68, at 178–79. 
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states have considered a reparations tax, but as Hayner notes, “the vast 
majority of reparations policies to date . . . have not relied on any special 
tax to cover the expense.”149 Second, in the event that the state is capable 
of paying reparations, they may “unsettle property rights and interfere 
with economic reform by creating new claims against existing property 
holders.”150 Last, identifying those individuals deserving of reparations 
can pose difficult and complex logistical questions for a poor nation 
emerging from war. Hayner notes that while truth commissions “produce 
a list of victims” and are “an obvious source on which to build a repara-
tions program,” they “usually document[] only a small portion of the to-
tal number of victims, and rarely ha[ve] the resources to corroborate all 
of the victim statements that [they] receive[].”151 Consequently, she con-
cludes that “in most circumstances a truth commission is not in a good 
position to provide a final list of recommended recipients.”152 
                                                                                                               
 149. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 171. 
 150. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 766. 
 151. HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 171. 
 152. Id. Nevertheless, in determining who should receive reparations, both Chile and 
Argentina have depended upon information compiled by the nations’ truth commissions. 
Id. at 172. 
  Since 1997, close to 5,000 Chileans have received a monthly pension from the 
government as part of its “‘pension plan’ for family members of those killed or disap-
peared under the military dictatorship.” Id. Survivors of torture are not included in the 
program. Id. at 173. The checks vary from approximately $345 to $482, depending on 
how many survivors there are in a family. Id. at 172–73. Children of those killed or dis-
appeared are entitled to extensive educational benefits and may waive mandatory military 
service. Id. at 173; Law Creating the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconcilia-
tion, Law No. 19, 123, arts. 29–32 (Jan. 31, 1992), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: 
HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 694 (Neil J. Kritz, ed., 
1995). 
  In Argentina, where close to 9,000 people disappeared under the military dictator-
ship, family members of the disappeared “receive[d] a lump sum of $220,000, paid in 
government bonds.” HAYNER, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR, supra note 68, at 175. 
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II. THE URGE TO PURGE: LUSTRATION LAW IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
Several Central European nations have used lustration153 to deal with 
the legacy of totalitarian Communism.154 The Czech Republic was the 
                                                                                                               
 153. See, e.g., Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration 
as a Tool of Transitional Justice, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 358–59 (1999); Vo-
jtech Cepl, Lustration in the CSFR: Ritual Sacrifices, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 24, 24 
(1992); Mark S. Ellis, Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the 
Former Communist Bloc, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (1996); Williams et al., supra 
note 14, at 3; Jiri Pehe, Parliament Passes Controversial Law on Vetting Officials, REP. 
ON E. EUR., Oct. 25, 1991, at 4, reprinted in 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 
547. The word lustration derives from the Latin lustratio, meaning “purification by sacri-
fice.” Boed, supra, at 358. 
 154. In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party seized power in February 1948. See 
JOHN F.N. BRADLEY, POLITICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1945–1990, at 27–28 (1991). Stalin-
ist purges followed, culminating in the notorious Slansky trial, in which major Czech 
Communist figures were tried on charges of treason. See HEDA MARGOLIUS KOVALY, 
UNDER A CRUEL STAR: A LIFE IN PRAGUE, 1948–1968 (Franci Epstein & Helen Epstein 
trans., 1986) (detailing the show trial and execution of Ms. Kovaly’s husband, who had 
served as foreign minister). Following Stalin’s death in 1953, token reforms were allowed 
in Czechoslovakia, culminating with the 1968 Prague Spring, during which democratici-
zation flourished. As the State Department has explained, “[a]fter January 1968, the Dub-
cek leadership took practical steps toward political, social, and economic reforms. In 
addition, it called for politico-military changes in the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact . . . .” 
U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Czech 
Republic (Sept. 2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3237.htm [hereinafter State 
Dep’t Note: Czech Rep.]. The Prague Spring came to a violent demise on August 21, 
1968. On that day, troops from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, and 
Poland invaded Czechoslovakia. The justification for the invasion appeared in Pravda on 
September 26. ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II: 
IMPERIAL AND GLOBAL 95 (2d ed. 1985). The article, soon dubbed the Brezhnev Doctrine, 
explained: 
  It should be stressed that even if a socialist country seeks to take an ‘ex-
trabloc’ position, it in fact retains its national independence thanks precisely to 
the power of the socialist commonwealth—and primarily to . . . the Soviet Un-
ion—and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world 
socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries . . . . Thus, the 
anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia were in essence using talk about the 
right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called neutrality and 
[Czechoslovakia’s] withdrawal from the socialist commonwealth. 
Id. As two scholars have written, “[t]he Soviet invasion . . . ended the optimum chance 
for a fundamental reform of a socialist regime and started the long process of the decay of 
communism that was to culminate in the Velvet Revolution just over two decades later.” 
BERNARD WHEATON & ZDENĚK KAVAN, THE VELVET REVOLUTION: CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 
1988–1991, at 3 (1992). The Velvet Revolution (referred to as such for its peaceful na-
ture) had its antecedents in police brutality. On November 17, 1989, police violently 
broke up a peaceful pro-democracy student march. State Dep’t Note: Czech Rep., supra. 
The violence inspired the Czech people and led to the creation of the Civic Forum, an 
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first Central European nation to pursue such a policy155 and the Czech 
lustration law has served as a model throughout the region.156 This sec-
tion considers lustration as a tool of transitional justice. It begins with a 
general overview of lustration law and concludes with an analysis and 
assessment of the Czech157 lustration law. 
A. Lustration Law in General 
Lustration includes “screening, disqualifying, and purging” former of-
ficials from elected and appointed state positions.158 Lustration laws typi-
cally draw on secret police files159—a fact that critics argue is an inherent 
                                                                                                               
umbrella pro-democracy organization led by the taciturn playwright Václav Havel. See 
id. By the end of December 1989 the Czech Communist Party had collapsed, leading to 
the appointment of Havel as President. Id. David Remnick beautifully explains Havel’s 
quixotic rise to power: 
A bourgeois boy becomes a bohemian playwright; he then becomes a dissident, 
who, for the crime of writing subversive essays and helping to organize a sub-
versive movement called Charter 77, is encouraged by the regime to master the 
art of welding in a reeking Czech prison; finally, in late November, 1989, eve-
rything implodes and he is leading demonstrations in Wenceslas Square, and 
hundreds of thousands of people are shouting “Havel na hrad!” (“Havel to the 
Castle!”); within days, he is the head of state, working in the same hilltop re-
doubt that served as a seat of power for dynasts of the Bohemian kingdom and 
the Hapsburg monarchy, for the emissaries of Berlin and the satraps of the 
Kremlin. 
David Remnick, Exit Havel: The King Leaves the Castle, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 17, 
2003, at 90. 
 155. Hungary instituted a lustration law in 1994 as did Poland in 1997. Williams et al., 
supra note 14, at 16. 
 156. See, e.g., Boed, supra note 153, at 359. 
 157. In 1990, Czechoslovakia changed its name to the Czech and Slovak Federal Re-
public (“CSFR”). On January 1, 1993, the CSFR ceased to exist and divided into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia with remarkably little violence. IRRECONCILABLE 
DIFFERENCES?: EXPLAINING CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S DISSOLUTION (Michael Kraus & Allison 
Stanger eds. and trans., 2000). 
  Following the split, the Czech Republic proceeded with lustration. The Slovakian 
President, Vladimir Mečiar, opposed lustration and beseeched the Constitutional Court to 
abrogate the law in 1994. Although the Court refused, the law was never invoked and 
ceased to exist in 1996. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 153, at 183. For an attempted 
explanation of the divergent responses to transitional justice in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, see Nadya Nedelsky, Divergent Responses to a Common Past: Transitional 
Justice in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 65 (2004). 
 158. Herman Schwartz, Lustration in Eastern Europe, 1 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 
141, 143 (1994). 
 159. Ellis, supra note 153, at 181. 
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weakness.160 As Mark Ellis, the former Executive Director of the Central 
and East European Law Initiative (“CEELI”) explains, this information is 
then “used to determine whether suspected individuals collaborated with 
the former state security service.”161 
Professor Herman Schwartz has explained that lustration law generally 
falls into one of two camps, “(1) those that ban a relatively large number 
of former functionaries from a wide range of . . . positions; and (2) those 
that apply to just a particular activity.”162 Act No. 451/1991 (the Czech 
lustration law) is an example of the former. As lustration only seeks to 
sanction those individuals in positions to undermine the democratic 
process, lustration as a tool of transitional justice could be thought of as a 
midpoint in terms of severity between retributive justice and restorative 
justice. Indeed, Roman David has referred to the Czech lustration law as 
“semi-retributive” in nature.163 Similarly, as a working paper for the Sus-
sex European Institute (“SEI”) explains, “[a]s sanctions go, those im-
posed by lustration are restrained.”164 
Lustration is often justified on a state security theory. It is argued that 
lustration can allow a fragile democracy to take root by preventing those 
who would harm it from serving in positions of power and undermining 
the process.165 In addition to this security argument, Professor Maria Łoś 
argues that lustration also achieves “historical truth”166  and “minimal 
                                                                                                               
 160. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 161. Ellis, supra note 153, at 181. 
 162. Schwartz, supra note 158, at 149. 
 163. Roman David, Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Lustra-
tion Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland (1989-2001), 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 
425 (2003) (“The Czech lustration law does not sanction every member of the past re-
pressive apparatus. Instead, it is primarily forward looking since it concerns only access 
to senior public posts in state institutions. Thus, the law . . . can be called ‘semi-
retributive.’”) (citation omitted). 
 164. Williams et al., supra note 14, at 18 (“Unlike the states of Europe liberated from 
German occupation in 1944–45, post-Communist democracies did not resort to the mass 
internment or summary execution of suspected collaborators, suspend their civil and po-
litical rights, or seize their property.”). 
 165. See, e.g., David, supra note 163, at 420 (“In the Czech Republic, the threat to 
democracy is reduced by removing some members of the totalitarian machinery from 
leading positions.”). See also Maria Łoś, Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revo-
lutions in Central Europe, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 117, 149 (The Vice-Minister of the 
Interior in the Czech-Slovak cabinet explained: “Is it so difficult to understand that peo-
ple want to know who the former agents and informers are? This is not an issue of venge-
ance, nor of passing judgments. This is simply a question of trusting our fellow citizens 
who write in newspapers, enact laws and govern our country.”). 
 166. Łoś, supra note 165, at 145 (“[L]ustration brings a clarification of values and a 
frank evaluation of the past, as well as a clear warning for the future. In its absence, one 
can expect a continuation of the lie and a dangerous, moral ambivalence.”). 
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justice.”167 One more affirmative purpose can be added to those proposed 
by Łoś. The SEI working paper argues that lustration generally serves to 
prevent blackmail and thus contributes to national reconciliation.168 Al-
though the example the authors use is from the Czech law, the argument 
has applicability to lustration law in general. They explain: 
Advocates of lustration warned that individuals with past associations 
with the security services who now held important public offices were 
open to blackmail. Conceivably, these people could be forced . . . to act 
against the public interest and subvert democracy; if they did not coop-
erate, their histories would . . . be divulged . . . and their lives ruined. 
Lustration was thereby presented as a necessary means to protect public 
safety and democracy by ensuring that occupants of prominent and sen-
sitive positions were not vulnerable to such duress.169 
One of the principle criticisms of Act No. 451/1991 is that it assigned 
collective guilt.170 It should be noted, however, that lustration laws may 
avoid such criticism by being narrowly tailored and by making individu-
alized assessments. Nevertheless, the following criticisms can be leveled 
at lustration regardless of how narrowly drawn the law may be. 
The first problem can be described as a personnel dilemma. That is, 
lustration often “exact[s] a heavy price from the society by denying it 
scarce human resources.”171 Countries which purge large segments of 
managerial and administrative expertise will find political and economic 
reconstruction extraordinarily arduous, for revolutionaries rarely have the 
                                                                                                               
 167. Id. at 146–47 (“Even if the justice discourse does not necessarily call for punish-
ment, and lustration measures are not penal in character, the underlying notion is one of 
retribution. Evil must be met with (at least some) evil. The wrongdoer must not be al-
lowed to profit from his misdeeds.”). 
 168. The argument is also made by the Czechoslovak Parliamentary Investigative 
Commission for the Clarification of the Events of November 17, 1989 (“Parliamentary 
Investigative Commission”), which was established prior to passage of Act No. 
451/1991. The Commission’s spokesman explains, “[t]he only way to prevent blackmail . 
. . and a series of political scandals that could surface at crucial moments is to clear the 
government and legislative bodies of these collaborators.” Petr Toman, Spokesman, Par-
liamentary Investigative Commission, Report on StB Collaborators to the Czechoslovak 
Federal Assembly (Mar. 22, 1991), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 152, 
at 308 [hereinafter Report on StB Collaborators]. 
 169. Williams et al., supra note 14, at 9. 
 170. See, e.g., Boed, supra note 153, at 359 (“The foremost legal criticism of the prac-
tice has been that lustration risks the miscarriage of justice by assigning collective guilt 
without a determination of an individual’s responsibility for any harm caused.”). 
 171. Schwartz, supra note 158, at 146. 
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skills necessary to run a modern administrative state.172 In his brilliant 
chronicle of the Soviet empire’s demise, David Remnick recounts a re-
mark a Russian official made to a Washington Post reporter. The official 
explained, “[w]hen we were forming the new structures, we had to hire 
people from the old structures. Our supporters—the people who came to 
rallies and street demonstrations—didn’t know anything about how to 
run a country.”173 Within the Russian official’s comments may lie a par-
tial solution—lustration law must take into account the wealth of talent 
available without members connected to the ancien regime and be will-
ing to compromise if there are too few of those individuals to effectively 
run the state. As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule note, “[w]ell-
designed schemes can finesse the dilemma, maintaining a critical mass of 
useful old-regime personnel while excising the officials who present the 
greatest threat to the new regime or whose presence would create the 
greatest public offense.”174 
A second problem with lustration is the source of information on which 
it relies. Secret police files in the Czech Republic and Soviet Union have 
proven to be both incomplete and inaccurate.175 With regard to incom-
pleteness, neither the files of the Czech secret police, the Státní 
bezpečnost (“StB”), nor the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopas-
nosti (“KGB”) contained the identities of those in the “top echelons of 
the system,”176 a fact that has led to Havel decrying the Czech law as 
only affecting the “small fry.” 177  With regard to inaccuracies, both 
sources of files have proven to be unreliable, with many files being “fal-
sified and deliberately distorted by agents seeking to exaggerate their 
achievements.”178 In one list of “alleged former ‘collaborators,’” Presi-
dent Havel’s name even appeared.179 Finally, in the unlikely event that 
secret police files could be certified as being complete and accurate, it is 
                                                                                                               
 172. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 778–79 (“Former resisters or 
revolutionaries are often the very people who have been denied technical education or 
political office . . . .”). 
 173. DAVID REMNICK, LENIN’S TOMB: THE LAST DAYS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE 505 (Vin-
tage Books 1994) (1993). 
 174. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 779. 
 175. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 158, at 151. 
 176. Cepl, supra note 153, at 25. See also Stephan Engelberg, The Velvet Revolution 
Gets Rough, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 31 (“We know that at least 
16,000 top-level agents were not listed in any registers. . . . We are chasing little fish.”) 
(quoting a Czech parliamentary deputy). 
 177. Mark Gibney, Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons from the Past and Pre-
sent, and Prospects for the Future, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 87, 126 (1994). 
 178. Schwartz, supra note 158, at 145. 
 179. Id. at 152. 
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debatable whether a state transitioning from totalitarian rule to democ-
racy would want to use them. As President Havel explained in a 1991 
interview, “[i]t is absurd that the absolute and ultimate criterion for a 
person’s suitability for performing certain functions in a democratic state 
should come from the internal files of the secret police.”180 
Finally, because lustration laws may implicate behavior that took place 
decades earlier, lustration raises the issue of procedural fairness.181 As 
time passes, exculpatory evidence may be lost or destroyed, witnesses 
may die, and memories may fade. Indeed, this is the purpose behind stat-
utes of limitations.182 As lustration laws are not criminal statutes, the 
principle of nulla poena sine lege does not generally apply. Nevertheless, 
in an amicus brief on the applicability of international agreements to the 
Czech law before the Constitutional Court of the Czech & Slovak Fed-
eral Republic (“CSFR”), a number of human rights organizations argued 
that the rationalization for the principle continues to apply. The brief 
notes, “[i]t is unfair to sanction someone today by today’s standards for 
what was legitimate and even considered laudatory in the past.”183 
B. The CSFR’s Screening (Lustration) Law 
1. Antecedents 
The Parliament of the CSFR passed Act No. 451/1991, the Czech 
Screening (“Lustration”) Law, on October 4, 1991.184 The act was origi-
nally scheduled to expire on December 31, 1996.185 Since that time, the 
law has been extended twice by the Czech Republic, first on September 
27, 1995 for five additional years, and indefinitely on October 25, 
2000.186 In each case, President Havel unsuccessfully attempted to veto 
                                                                                                               
 180. Michnik & Havel, supra note 24, at 538. 
 181. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 158, at 147. 
 182. See, e.g., Marc A. Massey, Comment, The Problem of Court Enforced Morality, 
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 461, 469 (2004) (“Statutes of limitations have been upheld on the 
basis that it is contrary to the notion of justice to fail to put one’s opponent on notice that 
he will need to defend himself within a reasonable amount of time and that ‘the right to 
be free from stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’”). 
 183. Brief for Helsinki Watch (U.S.A.) et al. in the Matter of the Constitutionality of 
Act No. 451/1991 (1992), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 343. 
 184. Screening (“Lustration”) Law, Act. No. 451/1991 (Oct. 4, 1991), reprinted in 3 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 312. 
 185. Id. art. 23, at 321. 
 186. See, e.g., David, supra note 163, at 409. See also Williams et al., supra note 14, at 
12 (“[R]ight-wing defenders of the legislation relocated the perceived threat from ex-
Communists in the mainstream leftist party, the Social Democrats, to justify the perma-
nent renewal of the law in 2000.”). 
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the extension.187 As of November 2002, over 400,000 individuals had 
been lustrated (screened) and approximately 12,000 individuals had 
tested positive, i.e. found to have collaborated with the StB.188 
Screening of individuals began with the run-up to the federal elections 
held in June 1990.189 With the exception of the Communists, all the po-
litical parties requested that their candidates be screened for past associa-
tion with the StB.190 A similar request came that fall in the run-up to lo-
cal elections, although this time it was not the parties that made the re-
quest, but the Czech National Council, which sought an order from the 
Czech Electoral Commission requiring that all parties screen their candi-
dates.191 While the Electoral Commission did not mandate screening, it 
did recommend that parties screen their candidates.192 As a result, some 
parties complied while others did not. This lack of uniformity allowed 
McCarthyite allegations to be made that collaborators were running the 
federal government. As a result, in January 1991, parliament passed 
Resolution 94, tasking the Parliamentary Investigative Commission for 
the Clarification of the Events of November 17, 1989 (“Parliamentary 
Investigative Commission”)193 with determining whether any members 
of parliament were registered as StB collaborators.194 On May 22, 1991, 
the Parliamentary Investigative Commission reported to the parliament 
that “fourteen members of the federal government and sixty other offi-
cials were declared to have been collaborators.”195 
With the Parliamentary Investigative Commission’s findings, calls for 
a more thorough lustration law became increasingly assertive. The final 
gasp of the Communists in the Soviet Union, taking shape in an at-
tempted coup against Gorbachev196 less than three months later, intensi-
                                                                                                               
 187. David, supra note 163, at 409. 
 188. Williams et al., supra note 14, at 6. 
 189. Pehe, supra note 153, at 545. 
 190. See, e.g., TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE’S GHOSTS 
AFTER COMMUNISM 70 (1995). 
 191. Pehe, supra note 153, at 545. 
 192. Id. 
 193. The Parliamentary Investigative Commission was composed of members of all 
the political parties in parliament. See Report on StB Collaborators, supra note 168, at 
307. 
 194. Lawrence Weschler, The Velvet Purge: The Trials of Jan Kavan, THE NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 19, 1992, at 66, 68. 
 195. Report on StB Collaborators, supra note 168, at 307. 
 196. See generally David Remnick, Three Days of Drama, Terror Will Shape the Fu-
ture, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1991, at A25. 
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fied the crusade.197 The next month, the government presented the par-
liament with a draft lustration law. Prior to presenting the draft, the gov-
ernment consulted with the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), 
which recognized the need “to remove from public institutions persons 
who took part in suppressing human rights.”198 Nonetheless, this draft 
version hardly resembled the law that was eventually passed and di-
verged from what would become Act No. 451/1991 in several important 
respects. First, the original draft was narrowly tailored in that it sought to 
identify individuals who had harmed others or committed human rights 
violations.199 Act No. 451/1991’s scope is much broader and implicates 
an individual if he is merely listed in StB files, regardless of the circum-
stances.200 The law’s inability to consider a host of mitigating circum-
stances201 and thereby allow for an individualized assessment is a trou-
blesome aspect of Act No. 451/1991. Closely related, the draft version 
operated on individual guilt, whereas Act No. 451/1991 “espouses the 
principle of collective guilt” as it “bar[s] entire categories of people . . . 
from holding certain positions.”202 Finally, the original draft placed the 
burden of proof on the government to show that the accused had sup-
pressed human rights whereas Act No. 451/1991 placed the burden on 
the accused to prove that he was not a collaborator.203 
                                                                                                               
 197. See, e.g., Williams et al., supra note 14, at 11 (“[T]he coup . . . sparked (vague) 
claims that Communist-era networks had been stirring during the brief time when it 
looked like Moscow might revert to a hard line.”). 
 198. International Labour Organization [ILO], Report of the Committee Set up to Ex-
amine the Representations Made by the Trade Union Association of Bohemia, Moravia 
and Slovakia and the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions Under Article 24 
of the ILO Constitution Alleging Non-Observance by the Czech and Slovak Federal Re-
public of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No.111), 
ILO Official Bulletin Supp. 1, Vol. LXXV, Series B, 1992, ¶ 44(1), GB.252/16/19 (Feb. 
28, 1992), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 152, at 322, 322–23 [herein-
after ILO Decision]. 
 199. See, e.g., Boed, supra note 153, at 369. 
 200. Id. at 378. 
 201. One can readily imagine a number of reasons (duress and necessity to name just 
two) why an individual living in a totalitarian regime would assist the security services. 
See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 820. See also Weschler, supra note 194, 
at 81 (“The law makes no provision for any such mitigating circumstances [as joining the 
dissident movement]. If you ever signed—if you’re listed in the registry . . . that’s it: 
You’re StB positive, and there’s no appeal. You’re lustrated.”) (quoting Jaroslav Basta, a 
Czech dissident). 
 202. Pehe, supra note 153, at 555. 
 203. Id. (“The chief flaw of the new legislation is that it is partially based on a pre-
sumption of guilt rather than of innocence: that is, the burden is on people in certain gov-
ernment positions to prove they did not work for the secret police . . . .”). 
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To come into law, Act No. 451/1991 had to be signed by the President, 
the philosopher-king Václav Havel.204 On the one hand, Havel consid-
ered the bill “very harsh and unjust,”205 yet he also appreciated the need 
“not [to] try to escape from the past.”206 In a remarkable interview, he 
explained: 
[A]s President, I must bear in mind that society needs some public ac-
tion in this regard because otherwise it would feel that the revolution 
remains unfinished. There are people whose own lives . . . have been 
destroyed by the regime . . . . 
. . . Our society has a great need to face that past, to get rid of the 
people who had terrorized the nation and conspicuously violated human 
rights, to remove them from the positions that they are still holding.207 
As the law could be revised once it had been passed, Havel chose to 
ratify Act No. 451/1991, but proposed several amendments. Among 
Havel’s recommendations were that those found to have been collabora-
tors be allowed to appeal the decision in court and that the law make an 
individualized determination of guilt, which would include consideration 
of mitigating factors. As he explained: 
The amendment that I proposed . . . provides for the right of appeal 
to an independent court, which would have the right to pronounce peo-
ple capable of holding certain positions according to the specific cir-
cumstances of the individual case. For example, if a person later fought 
for human rights, the court would have the power to declare that this 
contribution was greater than the guilt of having belonged to something 
sometime in the past. This would also cover persons who were forced 
to cooperate with the regime . . . .208 
Despite such remonstrations, parliament refused to implement any of the 
President’s proposals. 
2. Act No. 451/1991 
The lustration law that passed in 1991 required that individuals serving 
in delineated positions209 present their employer with a certificate from 
the Ministry of Interior that the individual did not fall into one of three 
                                                                                                               
 204. For references to Havel as such, see Paul Berman, Havel’s Burden; The Philoso-
pher-King is Mortal, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1991, § 6 (Magazine). 
 205. Michnik & Havel, supra, note 24, at 538. 
 206. Id. at 537. 
 207. Id. at 539–40. 
 208. Id. at 538. 
 209. The positions are listed in Article 1 of the Lustration law. See Act No. 451/1991 
art. 1(1). 
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delineated categories210 during the period from February 25, 1948 to No-
vember 17, 1989.211 The duty is on the employee to obtain the certificate. 
                                                                                                               
 210. The categories listed in Article 2 include: 
(a) a member of the National Security Corps detailed to any State Security sec-
tion; 
(b) listed on the files of the State Security as a resident, an agent, a holder of a 
lent-out apartment, a holder of a conspiratorial apartment, an informer or an 
ideological collaborator of the State Security; 
(c) a conscious collaborator of the State Security; 
. . . . 
Id. art. 2(1). 
  The law defines a “conscious collaborator” in the following manner: 
[T]he citizen concerned has been listed on the files of the State Security as a 
confidant, a candidate of secret collaboration or as a secret collaborator of con-
fidential contacts and knowledge, and he knew he was in contact with a mem-
ber of the National Security Corps and was giving him information through the 
form of clandestine contacts, or was implementing tasks set by him. 
Id. art. 2(2). 
  In an action brought by ninety-nine members of the Federal Assembly, the Con-
stitutional Court of the CSFR found the Article 2(c) category unconstitutional. Decision 
on Act No. 451/1991, Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Pl. 
US 1/92 (Nov. 26, 1992), available at http://test.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/p-1-92.html. 
The Court held that having a certificate indicating such collaboration could “merely ex-
press[] the intention of the State Security to recruit the recorded persons for conscious 
collaboration in the future.” Id. 
  In upholding the rest of the law, the Court noted: 
  In a democratic society, it is necessary for employees of state and public 
bodies . . . to meet certain criteria of a civic nature, which we can characterize 
as loyalty to the democratic principles upon which the state is built. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . Even . . . Act No. 451/1991 was based on [democratic values and crite-
ria]. It cannot be understood as revenge against particular persons or groups of 
persons, nor as discrimination against persons who, . . . alone or in cooperation 
with or through a repressive body, had violated fundamental human rights and 
basic freedoms . . . . 
  The statute . . . does not even discriminate against such persons (neither in 
employment nor in their profession), it merely provides . . . certain additional 
preconditions for those positions designated as crucial by law, or for engaging 
in a licensed trade . . . . 
Id. 
 211. Act No. 451/1991 art 2(1). 
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Should he fail to do so, his employment will terminate within fifteen 
days from the date the organization received notice.212 
3. Assessment 
The Czech lustration law has been the subject of much criticism, in-
cluding a 1992 decision by the ILO that Act No. 451/1991 violated Con-
vention No. 111.213 Nevertheless, to adequately assess Act No. 451/1991 
one must consider whether the act, and more generally lustration, meet 
the stated goals of transitional justice. The typology suggested by Profes-
sor Łoś, that lustration achieves “historical truth” and “minimal jus-
tice,”214 and the additional goal of national reconciliation, offer a useful 
starting point. 
In terms of state security and safeguarding democracy, Act No. 
451/1991 clearly achieved this goal. As Timothy Garton Ash, Professor 
of European Studies at Oxford and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institu-
tion, notes, “there is no doubt that the [lustration] law did keep a number 
of highly compromised persons out of public life in Czech lands, while 
such persons remained to do much damage in Slovakia.”215 
With regard to exposing historical truth, the Czech law did not fare as 
well. Under Act No. 451/1991, a lustrated person could choose not to 
reveal his status to the public once his status was revealed to his em-
ployer. As Roman David explains, 
The entire lustration process is kept secret; the lustration certificate is 
delivered to the person concerned and cannot be published without her 
consent. Thus, a positively lustrated person has to leave her position 
without any public knowledge of her collaboration. The dilemma of the 
truth versus the protection of the personality of former informers has 
been solved for the benefit of the latter.216 
As a result, lustration was unable to serve the very important transi-
tional justice function of reckoning with the past. Nevertheless, this is a 
specific weakness of Act No. 451/1991 rather than a general weakness of 
lustration. It would not be burdensome to devise a lustration process in 
which results of a positive lustration could be made public provided that 
an appeals process had first been exhausted. 
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 213. See ILO Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 81, 105. See also ILO Convention (No. 
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There are clearly more efficacious mechanisms of achieving “justice” 
than lustration. Lustration is “semi-retributive” and forward-looking in 
nature, as it does not seek to punish all former members of a repressive 
regime, but only those who held positions in public life.217 Nonetheless, 
as the example of Sierra Leone indicates, nations are free to choose 
among a variety of transitional justice mechanisms, and no single 
mechanism itself is sufficient to achieve all the goals of transitional jus-
tice. Provided that they do not violate the principle of nulla poena sine 
lege, selective prosecutions should be implemented along with a lustra-
tion process, thus achieving justice. 
With regard to achieving national reconciliation, there is no doubt that 
today the Czech Republic is a vibrant democracy and stable economy.218 
Whether these remarkable achievements are the result of lustration is 
hotly disputed. As noted, the SEI argues that by curtailing the possibility 
of blackmail, lustration helps achieve national reconciliation to some 
degree.219 Roman David also argues that Act No. 451/1991 has “substan-
tially helped reduce political tensions.”220 On the other hand, Roman 
Boed has argued that “[l]ustration has had divisive effects on the socie-
ties that have experienced it [and] [i]t thus seems that the effect of lustra-
tion would be to move society away from national reconciliation rather 
than towards it.”221 Neil Kritz has also admonished that “if extended too 
broadly, purges can have the destabilizing effect of creating a large, os-
tracized, and unemployed element within society.”222   
III. THE SEARCH FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN IRAQ 
One may argue that with the death of Saddam Hussein on December 
30, 2006, no further efforts need be made toward national reconciliation. 
The fact is, however, that while Hussein had a capacity for evil not likely 
rivaled since Hitler or Stalin, acting alone, he would have been incapable 
of transforming Iraq into the state of horrors it had become at the time of 
the American invasion on March 20, 2003. As the International Center 
for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center at Berkeley ex-
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plain, “[t]he [Ba’ath] party as a social institution was clearly identified as 
an instrument of oppression and control that was the means by which 
Saddam Hussein entrenched his grip over all aspects of Iraqi life.”223 
Similarly, as an Iraqi scholar posited: 
     The Ba’th regime differs from all its predecessors in Iraq not only in 
the sanctification of violence in its ideology and its idiom but also in 
having made it into a pivotal tool in running the country. It has built up 
security services that are among the best endowed and most skillful in 
the world and that have penetrated every sector of Iraqi society, includ-
ing economic life. They have turned themselves into a vast apparatus of 
terror and violence.224 
For thirty-five years, or “more than a third of modern Iraq’s exis-
tence,”225 thousands of Ba’ath party members inflicted countless acts of 
unimaginable cruelty and savagery upon the Iraqi people. Indeed, the 
Sunni-Shi’a sectarian violence that now threatens to destroy Iraq has its 
roots in the Ba’ath party apparatus that allowed the Sunni minority to 
systematically persecute the Shi’a majority. 226  Consequently, there is 
much work to be done from a transitional justice perspective in Iraq, but 
not until the security pillar has been firmly erected. 
This section first presents a brief history of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath 
Party. It then looks to the dizzying spate of post-Ba’ath developments, 
beginning with the American invasion in 2003. Next it considers the two 
transitional justice mechanisms heretofore implemented in post-Saddam 
Iraq; the Iraqi Special Tribunal and efforts at de-Ba’athification. 
A. The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party 
 When one considers what was, until 2003, the centrality of the 
Ba’ath to the ordinary Iraqi’s life, it is quite remarkable that the party 
was not “homegrown,” but rather had established itself in Syria for a 
decade before being transported to Baghdad from Damascus. 227  The 
party initially developed out of what the Ba’ath claim was a “struggle” 
against French colonial rule and it attracted young urban intelligentsia.228 
Although Saddam Hussein would not join the party until 1959, the party 
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retained this membership profile when he joined—a fact which clearly 
distinguished the poor and uneducated Saddam from other party 
members.229 
The Arabic word Ba’ath means “resurrection.”230 Indeed, central to 
Ba’ath ideology is a longing to return to past greatness—a concept 
returned to time and again by Ba’ath leadership.231 For example, Saddam 
Hussein invoked this concept before his disastrous invasion of Kuwait. 
Hussein explained, “[t]he opportunity we speak of is a [sic] historic 
opportunity; the Arab nation will either . . . move to regain its . . . 
universal task, or else it will remain in the state its enemies wish to see it 
in.”232 Similarly, Kanan Makiya has explained that “[p]arochialism and 
mythmaking, the twin pillars of Ba’thist ideology, . . . both emanate from 
the unifying idea of a permanently hostile outside always directing its 
attention to Ba’thism.”233 
The party’s motto is “Unity, freedom, socialism.”234 All three terms 
can be seen as foreign, not only to Iraq, but in a larger sense, to Arab 
society235—a fact that makes the ideology’s unparalleled success all the 
more remarkable. The term “unity,” which refers to Arab unity, does not 
appear a single time in the Qur’an.236 The term “freedom,” which refers 
to freedom from foreign control, appears to have been borrowed from the 
French Revolution’s idea of liberté.237 The term “socialism” refers to 
Arab socialism.238 
The Ba’ath Party came to power in Syria in March 1963 and has had a 
monopoly on power there ever since.239 A month before its ascendancy to 
power in Syria, the Ba’ath Party attempted a coup in Iraq, but it lasted 
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less than a year.240 Splits in the party were primarily to blame for its 
failure, but, as Phebe Marr notes, it was significant for three lessons, 
which would be internalized by a young but already influential Saddam 
Hussein: 
The first is that ideological divisions . . . are to be avoided at the top at 
all costs. Second, that potential military opponents must be moved out 
of power as soon as possible. Third, it is easier to gain power than to 
maintain it. In any future government, gaining control over the 
instruments of state would be paramount. For this purpose, a security 
apparatus would prove far more effective than a party or the military.241 
The Ba’ath would not make the same mistakes again, and five years 
later the party undertook another, albeit successful, coup, plummeting 
Iraq into a whirlwind of terror that would last thirty-five years. The Arab 
world’s stunning defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War no doubt played a role 
in the downfall of the Kassem military regime,242 but credit must be 
given to the Ba’ath. As Marr notes, “the leadership that emerged in 1968 
was a more practical and seasoned group than that of 1963; it was also 
more ruthless, more conspiratorial, and above all, more determined to 
seize power and this time to hold it.”243 Despite Saddam Hussein’s later 
embellishments that he “learned how to fire the gun of a tank” during the 
coup, it was a “totally bloodless coup.”244 
Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein became, respectively, 
President and Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council 
(“RCC”). 245  In this capacity, Hussein was in charge of the state 
intelligence and security apparatuses.246 That year, a new constitution 
was also promulgated. 247  As the United States Institute of Peace 
(“USIP”) notes, “the new Baathist constitution marginalized the judiciary 
by ending the separation of powers, making civilian courts subservient to 
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the military court system, and creating special courts outside the regular 
judicial system.” 248  In another development with far-reaching conse-
quences for the courts, James Dobbins explains that the regime made 
the deliberate decision . . . to encourage a return to tribal justice as part 
of its policy of retribalizing Iraq to fragment political opposition. This 
policy has meant that significant portions of the population have effec-
tively been distanced from the state’s criminal justice system, resorting 
instead to tribal elders and a range of traditional, sometimes summary, 
forms of justice.249 
In one indicative example of the ever-widening grip of the various 
security apparatuses over Iraqi society, in 1969 the Iraqi Penal Code was 
amended to include an entire chapter on “[o]ffences against the internal 
security of the State.”250 Similarly, as USIP notes: 
Over time, as Hussein consolidated power, the [Iraqi National Police] 
became increasing marginalized and their responsibilities for internal 
security and protecting the regime were taken over by the various secu-
rity organizations. The police remained responsible for law enforce-
ment, but the pervasiveness of the regime’s security apparatus and its 
brutal methods meant that crimes were more likely to be committed by 
regime operatives than criminals.251 
At first, Saddam Hussein was careful to play mentee to al-Bakr and not 
to challenge his mentor, but it was undeniable that power was steadily 
gravitating toward the apprentice.252 When al-Bakr resigned253 on July 
16, 1979, Hussein was waiting, and he became President, Secretary-
General of the Ba’ath Party Regional Command, RCC Chairman, and 
Commander-in-Chief of the military.254 As Marr expertly notes, “[t]he 
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changing of the guard marked a decisive shift, already under way, from a 
one-party state to a personal, autocratic regime, dependent for security—
and increasingly for decisions—on Saddam Husain and his close family 
members and cohorts.”255 Less than two weeks later, Hussein engaged in 
a Stalinist-style purge lasting two weeks and resulting in the deaths of 
twenty-two top Ba’ath leaders and the imprisonment of forty others.256 
The show trials were videotaped and “distributed to all security offices, 
to be shown to the public as a warning to ‘other traitors and conspira-
tors.’”257 Also at this time, a formidable personality cult—which would 
last for the next twenty-four years—began to develop around Hussein.258 
B. Post-Ba’ath Developments 
In the past four years, Iraq’s political landscape has seen a dizzying ar-
ray of changes as the United States and a new generation of Iraqi leaders 
have attempted to purge Iraq of its Ba’athist past. Iraq was under foreign 
occupation from April 2003 until June 28, 2004, when sovereignty was 
transferred (in principle) to the Interim Iraqi Government.259 
Following the downfall of the Ba’ath regime in the spring of 2003, the 
United States created the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”).260 On 
May 6, 2003, President Bush appointed L. Paul Bremer III, a former dip-
lomat and ambassador to the Netherlands, as his special envoy and head 
of the CPA.261 In July 2003, the CPA, in agreement with Iraqi political 
parties and former exiles, appointed the broad-based twenty-five member 
Iraqi Governing Council (“IGC”).262 Mr. Bremer’s tenure was marked by 
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a rising insurgency, escalating violence, and controversy. Lakhdar Bra-
himi, the United Nations special envoy, had a strained relationship with 
Mr. Bremer, claiming at one point that “Mr. Bremer is the dictator of 
Iraq.”263 Quite inexplicably, Mr. Bremer has argued that his disastrous 
policy of “deBaathification . . . was his most popular act.”264 
On June 28, 2004, the CPA dissolved and sovereignty was transferred 
to interim President Sheikh Ghaz Mashal Ajil al-Yawer and interim 
Prime Minister Dr. Iyad Allawi, who would each hold power until elec-
tions in January 2005.265 Dr. Allawi is a secular Shi’a, who, according to 
BBC News, “ha[d] the advantage as prime minister . . . of being equally 
mistrusted by everyone in Iraq’s multifarious population.”266 On January 
30, 2005, amidst rising violence, Iraqis elected the members of a 275-
member Transitional National Assembly (“TNA”). It is estimated that 
fifty-seven percent of eligible voters took part in the election.267 Three 
months later, the TNA approved the Iraqi Transitional Government 
(“ITG”), and Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader, was named to the largely 
ceremonial post of President of Iraq, making him the “first Kurd to serve 
as president of an Arab-dominated country.” 268  Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a 
Shi’ite, was named Prime Minister,269 the most powerful post. 
On October 15, 2005, a constitution written largely by Shi’ites and 
Kurds was submitted to the Iraqi people in a referendum.270 Unlike their 
boycott of the January elections, Sunni Arabs participated heavily in the 
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referendum.271 While seventy-nine percent of the voters approved the 
constitution, the vote was largely split along sectarian lines, with the 
Shi’ites and Kurds favoring the document and the Sunnis largely reject-
ing it.272 At the time of the referendum, the results of a secret poll by the 
United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense were leaked to the British public. 
The poll left little doubt that coalition forces had overwhelmingly failed 
to win the peace in Iraq. Quite astonishingly, the poll indicated that 
eighty-two percent of Iraqis were “strongly opposed” to coalition troops’ 
presence; sixty-seven percent of Iraqis felt less secure as a result of the 
occupation; and alarmingly, forty-five percent of all Iraqis believed that 
attacks against coalition forces were justified.273  Similarly, a January 
2006 poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes, 
the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of 
Maryland, and the World Public Opinion Web site revealed that a whop-
ping eighty-eight “percent of Sunni Arabs and [forty-one] percent of Shi-
ites approved of attacks on US forces.”274 
On December 15, 2005 elections were again held, this time to elect a 
permanent Iraqi National Assembly. The elections were generally peace-
ful, and following the trend they set during the constitutional referendum, 
the Sunnis participated in large numbers and were rewarded with roughly 
one-fifth of the seats in the 275-member Assembly.275 Despite the peace-
ful nature of the elections, the seeds of sectarianism were evident. One 
astute observer has noted that “[f]ewer than one in ten Iraqis had voted 
for parties that crossed ethnic or religious lines.”276 On May 20, 2006, 
Nouri Kamel al-Maliki, a Shi’a, was named Prime Minister and Iraq’s 
first permanent government replaced the ITG.277 Despite heading a gov-
ernment of “national unity,”278 Al-Maliki’s Iraq remains a powder keg, 
with ever-escalating sectarian violence between Shi’a and Sunnis—a fact 
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that underscores the need for transitional justice mechanisms, explored 
below. 
C. Transitional Justice in Post-Ba’ath Iraq 
1. The Iraqi Special Tribunal 
On December 10, 2003, just three days prior to the arrest of Hussein in 
a tiny cellar outside of Tikrit,279 Iraq’s transitional IGC established the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IST”) to try Iraqis on international and domestic 
crimes.280 Despite concerns from human rights organizations,281 the Bush 
administration ceded to the IGC’s wish that Iraqis alone try Hussein.282 
The IST’s jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide,283 crimes against 
humanity,284 war crimes,285 and specific provisions of Iraqi law.286 The 
IST covers such crimes committed during Ba’ath rule (between July 17, 
1968 and May 1, 2003).287 In a controversial appointment, the IGC ap-
pointed Salem Chalabi, the nephew of the head of the Iraqi National 
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Congress (“INC”) and neo-conservatives’ favorite Iraqi exile Ahmed 
Chalabi, to head the IST.288 Salem Chalabi has estimated that one hun-
dred Iraqis would be tried before the IST.289 
Saddam Hussein’s dramatic trial got underway on July 17, 2005 with 
the filing of charges for a little known massacre perpetrated by the dicta-
tor in the Shi’ite town of al-Dujail that resulted in the death of about 380 
people.290 In April 2006, Hussein and six co-defendants were charged 
with genocide for the savage al-Anfal campaign conducted against the 
Kurds in the late 1980s.291 On November 5, 2006, the IST convicted 
Saddam of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to death by 
hanging.292 On December 26, 2006, Iraq’s highest court rejected Sad-
dam’s appeal and upheld his death sentence.293 He was executed on De-
cember 30, 2006 in what many observers considered a sectarian lynching 
that would further destabilize Iraq.294 During the summer of 2007, an 
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Iraqi court sentenced Saddam’s infamous cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid 
(also known as Chemical Ali), to death for genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity committed during the Anfal campaign, which 
killed 182,000 people.295 On September 4, 2007, an Iraqi appeals court 
upheld al-Majid’s death sentence.296 
Prior to the IST’s establishment, a number of options to prosecute Hus-
sein and his cohorts were considered, ranging from prosecution before an 
international tribunal established by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil,297 to prosecution before the recently established International Crimi-
nal Court,298 or a hybrid court that would include both local and interna-
tional jurists.299 The decision to try Hussein and other top Ba’athists by 
an all-Iraqi tribunal has been the subject of heated criticism. First, human 
rights lawyers questioned whether Iraqi judges with little experience in 
international criminal law were up to the monumental task of trying Hus-
sein in a case that would likely include “hundreds of witnesses and mil-
lions of documents.”300 Second, some observers have argued that trying 
Hussein before an all-Iraqi tribunal would not greatly enhance the capac-
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ity of the local judiciary.301 Third, observers have argued that the IST’s 
legitimacy has been weakened as a result of its composition, a point that 
leaves the IST susceptible to the claim that it is nothing more than a tool 
of the United States “dispensing victors’ justice.”302 
2. De-Ba’athification 
The very first order passed by the American-controlled CPA was the 
“De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.”303 As of this writing, the policy has 
resulted in up to eighty-five thousand Ba’athists, most of them Sunni 
Arabs, losing their jobs.304 Prima facie, it is remarkable how closely the 
CPA’s plan for de-Ba’athification resembles Act No. 451/1991, the 
needlessly harsh lustration law enacted in the Czech Republic. Clearly 
and quite unfortunately, Mr. Bremer and company never bothered to 
consider Act No. 451/1991 in formulating their own vetting program 
embodied in CPA Order Number 1 (“Order No. 1”). Nor did Mr. Bremer 
consider the views of a joint and interagency workshop convened by 
Army staff, conducted on December 10–11, 2002. The group categori-
cally advised against the type of top-down de-Ba’athification Order No. 
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1 would implement.305 Rather, the group encouraged a bottom-up ap-
proach similar to that employed in the dismantling of the Nazi party in 
post-war Germany.306 Nor did Mr. Bremer heed the advice of those on 
the ground, including General Jay Garner, Bush’s first head of the post-
war mission in Iraq, who claimed the policy was “too hard,” or the CIA 
station chief in Baghdad, who claimed the policy would “undercut the 
operation” of Iraq.307 
Section 1(2) of Order No. 1 reads: “Full members of the Ba’ath Party 
holding the ranks of . . . Regional Command Member . . . Branch Mem-
ber . . . Section Member . . . Group Member . . . are hereby removed 
from their positions and banned from future employment in the public 
sector.”308 Like Act No. 451/1991, Order No. 1 mandates vetting for cer-
tain classes of people employed in the public sector. Section 1(3) reads: 
“Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in 
every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other 
government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be inter-
viewed for possible affiliation with the Ba’ath Party, and subject to in-
vestigation for criminal conduct and risk to security.”309 
The process of de-Ba’athification is carried out by the Iraqi de-
Ba’athification Council, established on May 25, 2003 by CPA Order 
Number 5.310 In an act that stunningly demonstrates the CPA’s egregious 
incompetency and failure to engage the aspirations of ordinary Iraqis, the 
CPA named Ahmed Chalabi as the head of the Iraqi de-Ba’athification 
Council.311 Once the golden boy of the Pentagon,312 Mr. Chalabi has 
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since fallen out of favor with some (but unfortunately not all) American 
policymakers as a result of accusations that he embellished intelligence 
to the Defense Department prior to the American invasion, and once the 
invasion had taken place, shared American intelligence with Iran.313 Mr. 
Chalabi once had far greater aspirations than head of the de-
Ba’athification Council, but high political office has proven elusive as he 
has no following in Iraq.314 Chalabi’s impact on the de-Ba’athification 
policy can not be overemphasized. Marine General Anthony Zinni, who 
oversaw the 1998 Desert Fox Raids on Iraq, has claimed, “I think the de-
Baathification . . . was at Chalabi’s insistence . . . . Iraqis told me this, 
Iraqis from inside during the war said that Chalabi was pushing Bremer 
to get rid of all of the Baathists because he wanted to put his people in 
those position, he could control them.”315 Peter Galbraith goes even fur-
ther in his assessment of Chalabi’s persuasiveness. He writes, “Ahmed 
Chalabi’s role in the events leading to the American invasion of Iraq 
cannot, in my view be overstated. If it were not for him, the United 
States military likely would not be in Iraq today.”316 For an unpopular yet 
ambitious figure to be given an exceedingly important post which can 
easily be manipulated to harm political rivals or enemies speaks to the 
CPA’s sheer incompetency. 
Concerns with Mr. Chalabi’s performance arose soon after his ap-
pointment. Former CIA analyst and Iraqi scholar Kenneth Pollack, for 
example, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he be-
lieved Mr. Chalabi was forging documents in his role as head of the 
Council.317 
Like Act No. 451/1991, Order No. 1 has been the subject of much 
criticism318—and for good reason. Like Act No. 451/1991, it fails to 
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make individualized assessments and instead espouses the principle of 
collective guilt—a grossly unfair concept when one considers the pres-
sure to join the Ba’ath Party in Saddam’s Iraq. Also, similar to Act No. 
451/1991, Order No. 1 deprived the struggling new Iraqi government of 
much needed talent, served to create a security vacuum, and helped fuel 
the insurgency.319 Finally, Order No. 1 achieved the nearly impossible; it 
further destabilized an already dangerously unstable country—the exact 
opposite of what transitional justice mechanisms are supposed to do. It 
actually made attainment of national reconciliation a more remote, rather 
than a closer, goal. Fareed Zakaria, the thoughtful editor of Newsweek 
International, in his review of George Packer’s Iraq war chronicle The 
Assassins’ Gate, states: 
     As a balancing act that kept Iraq’s three communities at peace, it 
[CPA Order No. 1] was a disaster. Bremer’s decisions signaled to 
Iraq’s Sunnis that they would be stripped of their jobs and status in the 
new Iraq. Imagine if, after apartheid, South Africa’s blacks had an-
nounced that all whites would be purged from the army, civil service, 
universities and big businesses. In one day, Bremer had upended the 
social structure of the country. And he did this without having in place 
a new ruling cadre that could take over from the old Sunni bureaucrats. 
     These decisions did not cause the insurgency, though it is worth not-
ing that for the first few months of the occupation, Sunni Falluja was 
much less of a problem for the United States than was Shiite Najaf. But 
Bremer fueled the dissatisfaction of the Sunnis, who now had no jobs 
but plenty of guns. And most especially, his decisions added to the 
chaos and dysfunction that were rapidly rising in Iraq.320 
Had Bremer and company consulted ordinary Iraqis rather than the 
self-serving Mr. Chalabi, they would have likely embarked upon a quite 
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different process. In the remarkable 2004 study Iraqi Voices, the Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center at 
Berkeley explain a comprehensive survey they conducted on Iraqi atti-
tudes toward transitional justice. On the subject of de-Ba’athification, the 
study’s findings are worth quoting at length: 
     It is significant that most respondents differentiated between the 
Ba’ath party leadership and those who actually ordered or committed 
human rights violations, and Ba’ath party members in general. With a 
few exceptions, respondents were reluctant to place the entire Ba’ath 
party membership on trial, and there was widespread recognition that 
Ba’ath party membership was a technique for survival under the old re-
gime that did not necessarily mean direct participation in human rights 
crimes.321 
In April 2004, Bremer’s Order No. 1 was significantly relaxed, allow-
ing “the quick return to the government payroll of former Baath Party 
members ‘who were Baathists in name only.’”322 As part of the rollback, 
and in an effort clearly designed to fill the security vacuum Order No. 1 
helped create, “senior army officers, including generals and full colonels, 
[were] allowed to return . . . .”323 Moreover, in the new strategy unveiled 
by President Bush on January 11, 2007 calling for a surge of more than 
20,000 soldiers and marines to Iraq, the President also called for easing 
the disastrous policy.324 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Post-conflict nations are best served when a holistic approach to transi-
tional justice is taken and efforts at achieving both peace and justice are 
balanced. The typology proposed by Juan E. Méndez, the President of 
the ICTJ, that post-conflict nations owe four duties to victims—justice, 
truth, reparations, and lustration,325 provides a useful model for consider-
ing transitional justice approaches in post-Ba’ath Iraq. 
A. Prosecution and Justice 
Méndez first calls for “an obligation to do justice, . . . to prosecute . . . 
the perpetrators of abuses when those abuses can be determined to have 
been criminal in nature.”326 The Iraqi Voices study of Iraqi social atti-
tudes toward transitional justice found “considerable support for holding 
perpetrators accountable through legal trials.”327 This is understandable, 
not only from the purely emotional perspective of a people who have 
suffered greatly, but particularly so when one considers the primacy of 
justice in Muslim culture. One Islamic scholar has referred to justice as 
“the defining theme of Islamic ethics,”328 noting that “[t]he major charac-
teristics of the society envisioned by the Qur’an are compassion, or kind-
ness, honestly, and justice.”329 The same author argues that the “Qur’an 
says that . . . God has called for justice.”330 Indeed, the Qur’an gives the 
following incantation: “Say: ‘My Lord hath commanded justice; and that 
ye set your whole selves (to Him) at every time and place of prayer, and 
call upon Him, making your devotion sincere as in His sight: such as He 
created you in the beginning, so shall ye return.’”331 
With the establishment of the IST, the question becomes who that Tri-
bunal will try. While the Ba’ath party delineated several layers of leader-
ship,332 for the purposes of transitional justice, three layers of culpability 
can be identified: Saddam and his inner circle; mid-ranking members—
the cogs in the Ba’ath machine (one eminent Iraqi journalist estimates 
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this would encompass 3,000 members);333 and the general Ba’ath party 
membership (estimated to be more than one million).334 Only the first 
layer—Saddam and his inner circle—should be tried by the IST. Those 
individuals who committed human rights abuses but were not members 
of the inner circle should be prosecuted in ordinary Iraqi criminal 
courts.335 
For purposes of competency, capacity building, and legitimacy, it is 
certainly unfortunate that the Bush administration chose to demonstrate 
its hostility toward international justice and cave in to Iraqi demands that 
the tribunal be composed solely of Iraqi judges and prosecutors. None-
theless, as Hussein’s cohorts are tried, the international community may 
still, and must, press for a greater background role, thereby enhancing the 
IST’s competency, capacity building, and legitimacy. Such a role is ex-
pressly authorized by article 6(b) of the IST’s statute: 
     The President of the Tribunal shall be required to appoint non-Iraqi 
nationals to act in advisory capacities or as observers to the Trial 
Chambers and to the Appeals Chamber. The role of the non-Iraqi na-
tionals shall be to provide assistance to the judges with respect to inter-
national law and the experience of similar tribunals (whether interna-
tional or otherwise), and to monitor the protection by the Tribunal of 
general due process of law standards.336 
B. Truth and Reconciliation 
Méndez next calls for an “obligation . . . to grant victims the right to 
know the truth.”337 As some form of amnesty is often “a necessary pre-
requisite for a [truth] commission,”338 all truth commissions allow for 
forgiveness. Forgiveness is an Islamic virtue. As one Islamic scholar 
notes, “[v]ariations on the term ‘be compassionate’ or ‘show mercy’ . . . 
occur hundreds of times in the Quran.”339 While the Qur’an affirms the 
Biblical injunction “an eye for an eye,” it also declares that eschewing 
retaliation and embracing forgiveness is an act of atonement: 
And We ordained for them: ‘Life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear 
for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal.’ But if anyone re-
mits the retaliation by way of charity, it is an act of atonement for him-
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self. And if any fail to judge by (the light of) what God hath revealed, 
they are (no better than) wrong-doers.340 
A truth commission would likely be seen in this light, and therefore 
supported by ordinary Iraqis. There are two reasons, however, to counsel 
against the establishment of such a commission at this time. First, it is 
questionable whether there is a truth to reveal in Iraq. As noted above, 
the Swiss Peace Foundation’s study on truth commissions concludes that 
they are particularly useful in two scenarios: where “the systems of abuse 
. . . [were] designed to hide the facts [and] [t]orture and related abuses 
were committed largely in secret” or where the truth is not hidden, but 
“multiple ‘truths’” exist,341 neither of which applies to post-Ba’ath Iraq. 
As Iraqi Voices notes, some of the participants in the study were skepti-
cal as to the value of a truth commission. The horrors which beset Iraq 
were no secret; Iraqis knew that the Ba’athist regime was a barbaric reign 
of terror that had no appreciation for human life or dignity.342 Whether 
there is truth to reveal is therefore questionable. 
A second concern is that Iraq lacks the requisite civil society to under-
take the challenges inherent in a truth commission. 343  For example, 
Kanan Makiya, in his introduction to the 1998 edition of Republic of 
Fear, excerpts a document signed by hundreds of exiled Iraqis: 
Civil society in Iraq has been continuously violated by the state in the 
name of ideology. As a consequence the networks through which civil-
ity is normally produced and reproduced have been destroyed. A col-
lapse of values in Iraq has therefore coincided with the destruction of 
the public realm for uncoerced human association.344 
Ultimately, the decision as to whether and when to establish a truth 
commission is one that the Iraqi people alone should make. 
C. Reparations 
A third obligation owed to victims, argues Méndez, is the “grant[ing] 
[of] reparations to victims in a manner that recognizes their worth and 
their dignity as human beings.”345 While the prosecution of Hussein and 
his henchmen is a clear form of retributive justice, reparations can be 
seen as a direct form of restorative justice, as they demonstrate efforts to 
assuage the horrors Iraqis suffered under the Ba’ath regime. A compre-
                                                                                                               
 340. THE HOLY QURAN, supra note 331, Surah 5:45. 
 341. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 342. IRAQI VOICES, supra note 2, at 39. 
 343. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 344. MAKIYA, supra note 2, at xxx. 
 345. See Méndez, supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
124 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:1 
hensive reparations system should be undertaken immediately through 
the establishment of a commission to investigate and determine dis-
bursements to victims. Reparations should take the form of both material 
and symbolic support; the former focusing on rebuilding lives, the latter 
on restoring dignity.346 
D. De-Ba’athification 
Finally, Méndez suggests that “states are obliged to see . . . that those 
who have committed the crimes while serving in any capacity in the 
armed or security forces of the state should not be allowed to continue on 
the rolls of reconstituted, democratic law-enforcement or security- 
related bodies.”347 As argued above, the overzealous and partisan de-
Ba’athification process in Iraq sacrificed scarce Iraqi talent and further 
exacerbated sectarian divisions by assigning collective guilt rather  
than making individualized assessments. Since its implementation, de-
Ba’athification in Iraq has been significantly moderated, and under pres-
sure from the Bush administration, Prime Minister al-Maliki has vowed 
to go further.348 This is certainly a welcome development. The remaining 
question, which can only be answered in time by the Iraqi people, is 
whether this and other efforts made toward transitional justice thus far 
are too little, too late. 
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